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CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT

CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
PART I: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, LEGAL MATRIX,
AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES
MASON

P.

THOMAS, JR.t

Terrible as the thought is to entertain, child abuse may be a regression to a characteristic which comes very close to being "natural"to
the human condition.'
[T]he general history of the child. . . moves as from one moun2
tain peak to another with a long valley of gloom in between.

The phenomenon of child abuse and maltreatment is deeply rooted
in our cultural and religious history. It is as old as civilization itself. Yet
the fact of child abuse has remained largely hidden and suppressed.
Reform movements that have pointed out the horrors being committed
upon children and attempted to provide some protection have occurred

at intervals, but in time the shocking facts of mistreatment seem always
to have been avoided or forgotten.
One reason for this suppression of facts is our reluctance to believe
that parents-whom we expect to love and protect their offspring-could maltreat or abuse their own children, sometimes even
fatally.3 Our laws and legal systems have developed over hundreds of
years around the expectation that parents will love and protect. Courts
have been reluctant to interfere in family government or to restrict the
right of parents to correct and discipline their children. Further, they
have given parents almost complete immunity from civil liability for
tProfessor of Public Law and Government, Institute of Government, University of North
Carolina. This article constitutes the first part of a two-part treatment on child abuse and neglect.
Part 11 will deal with the development of legal and social responses to the phenomenon in North
Carolina. Financial assistance for this study was provided by the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare through a grant to the Division of Law and Order, North Carolina Department of
Natural and Economic Resources. The author expresses his appreciation to Thomas F. Taft, thirdyear student at the University of North Carolina School of Law, who contributed substantially to
the research and content of this article.
ID. BAKAN, SLAUGHTER OF THE INNOCENTS: A STUDY OF THE BATrERED CHILD PHENOMENON

56 (197 1) [hereinafter cited as BAKAN].
2G. PAYNE, THE CHILD IN HUMAN PROGREss 302 (1916) [hereinafter cited as PAYNE].
3
David Bakan, a psychologist, interprets the historical purpose of child abuse as population
control and a way of securing a population-resource balance. BAKAN 107, 112-114.
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injuries to their own children. One writer has interpreted this general
legal situation as a "license to continue to abuse." 4
Modern X-ray technology, however, has provided new documentation of physical abuse of children that has forced a reappraisal of society's responsibility to protect children, even from their own parents.
As a result, child-abuse reporting laws have been adopted in all states
in an effort to afford this protection. Two questions that confront one
who is considering the problem of child abuse are whether reporting laws
are asatisfactory answer and whether the current interest in child protection is only transistory. Will child abuse and neglect fade from public
concern as it has in the past?
HISTORIC MALTREATMENT OF CHILDREN

Over the centuries infanticide, ritual sacrifice, exposure, mutilation,
abandonment, harsh discipline, and exploitation of child labor have been
only some of the ways in which children have been mistreated. Infanticide-the killing of newborn infants with the explicit or implied consent
of parents and the community-has been a form of birth control, a way
of avoiding the embarassment of an illegitimate child, a method of
disposing of a weak or deformed child, and a means of serving religious
beliefs. Numerous religions have required that the first-born be sacrificed to an angry god. In some societies, female children were sacrificed
because they were considered useless. Abandonment or exposure to the
elements of a child who was unwanted or who could not be provided for
was a form of infanticide that was common in ancient societies.'
Ancient Greece knew exposure and infanticide well. The favorite
figure in the comedy of the fourth century, B.C., was the child who had
been exposed, saved, and later found by his parents. In Greece a child
was the absolute property of his father, who had to decide whether he
would live or die; on the fifth day after birth, at the ceremony of Amphidromia, the father was forced to decide whether or not to receive the
infant into the family. Under Greek law property was divided among the
4V. DE FRANCIS, CHILD ABUSE LEGISLATION: ANALYSIS AND STUDY OF MANDATORY REPORT-

3 (1966).
5For an excellent detailed discussion of the fate of children in human history see PAYNE. For a
more summary approach see Radbill, A History of ChildAbuse andInfanticide, in THE BATTERED
CHILD 3 (1968), [hereinafter cited as Radbill]. See also A. KADUSHIN, CHILD WELFARE SERVICES
30-36 (1967) [hereinafter cited as KADUSHIN].
ING LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES
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male children. Thus, the father might be inclined to raise the first son,
while the second would be exposed in order not to dilute the inheritance.
Girls were less important and more frequently exposed. The task of
exposing a child was performed by a slave or midwife, who would take
him to a public place early in the day, hoping that he might be rescued.
Often, valuable objects were left with the child as an inducement to
rescue.6
Under ancient Roman law the father had a power of life and. death
(patriapotestas) over his children that extended into adulthood. He.
could kill, mutilate, sell, or offer his child in sacrifice. While infanticide
was not common in Rome, exposure was widespread. Although the
exposed child usually died, he might be rescued for pity or for profit. A
Roman mother, who was obliged to follow the order of the father, would
sometimes arrange for the exposed child to be rescued. During periods
of prosperity a Roman father might sell the services of his son under an
arrangement akin to an apprenticeship or a labor contract. Eventually,
however, some reforms came about: No child might be killed before the
age of three; male children were to be saved, perhaps for military reasons. Later the law permitting infanticide was abolished, although infants could be sold into slavery. Under Emperor Hadrian, a father who
had killed his grown son for committing a crime was banished under the
''7
maxim "patria potestas in pietate debet, non in atrocitate, consistere.
The Bible contains many references to infanticide. Whatever its
historical accuracy, the Bible does reflect man's concerns throughout
history. From the Old Testament we have the story of Abraham, whose
loyalty to God was tested when he was instructed to offer his son, Isaac,
as a burnt offering. A ram was substituted when God was satisfied of
Abraham's faith and love." One writer has interpreted the Jewish tradition of circumcision as a substitute for the religious sacrifice of human
life by the command of God to Abraham. 9 The story of Moses is a
Biblical example of abandonment or exposure.10 Christianity began with
'See PAYNE 191-98.
'1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTrARIES § 452. This translates to read: Parental authority should
consist or be exercised in affection, not in atrocity. For details on Roman law and practices see
PAYNE 212-44.
'Genesis 22:1-13.
'PAYNE 159-60; Genesis 17:10 reads: "This is my covenant, which ye shall keep, between me

and you and thy seed after thee; Every man child among you shall be circumcised."
"Exodus 2:1-10.
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the Slaughter of the Innocents, when Christ escaped the order of King
Herod that male infants be killed." There was a time in many Christian
countries when children were whipped on Innocents Day in order to
make them remember Herod's massacre. 12
Historically, infanticide has usually been accomplished by bloodless
methods-strangulation, drowning, smothering, burial alive, and incineration-and often for a ritualistic purpose. In China, India, Mexico,
and Peru, children were cast into rivers in an effort to bring fine harvests
and good fortune. In other early cultures the blood and flesh of slain
infants was thought to confer vigor and health, and, as a result, it was
fed to expectant mothers or favored siblings. Kings were worshipped as
gods in some ancient societies, and, therefore, were expected to assure
good crops and prevent public catastrophes. If the king failed in his
godly duties, his subjects expected him to give himself in3 sacrifice. Kings
would sometimes offer a son as a sacrificial substitute.1
An ancient form of infanticide was the immurement of children in
foundations of buildings and other structures. Joshua demanded that
whoever rebuilt Jericho should sacrifice his first-born in the foundation
and his youngest son under the gates. 4 Archaeological finds under house
corners, thresholds, and floors have revealed jars containing the bones
of newborn infants of the Canaanites. Pottery furnaces were consecrated
in China with the shedding of children's blood. Children were probably
immured in the dikes of the German city of Oldenburg until the seventeenth century. The practice of putting children in the foundations of
buildings was also common in ancient India. 5
Infafiicide was practiced in early Scandinavian cultures and in
European countries nearly into the twentieth century. In rare sarcasm
Jonathan Swift made a proposal in 1729 to prevent the children of
Ireland from becoming a burden to their parents: Infants could be cared
for and fattened for human consumption during the first year after birth
for two shillings, sold for ten shillirqgs to be eaten, thus giving the mother
a profit of eight shillings. 6 An essay contest on how to prevent infanticide, held in 1781 in German-speaking Europe, attracted four hundred
"Matthew 2:16.
"Radbill 3.
13d. at 9.
"Joshua6:26.
15BAKAN 30.
111d. at 39-40.
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entries.17 An early edition of the EncyclopaediaBritannicaindicated that
infanticide was common in the leading nations of Europe among farm
laborers and domestic servants. It was closely related to illegitimacy but
not confined to unmarried mothers." Infanticide was common in China
well into the twentieth century.
Some children survived the alternate form of infanticide-abandonment-because of fortunate circumstances. Ancient stories and legends have dramatized the long history of the practice. Romulus and Remus, the legendary founders of Rome, were exposed, rescued,.
and suckled by a wolf. Many historical figures took pride in their hazardous beginning in life as a foundling. The story of Hansel and Gretel
describes such an attempted abandonment. 9
The great Semitic religions-Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam-have always protested against the slaughter and misuse of children. The early Christians preached against infanticide and exposure as
murderous acts, and the church became the place where mothers abandoned their children, knowing that the priest would place the children
with someone in the parish."0 In the sixth century the European religious orders began to provide asylums for abandoned children to combat the practices of exposure and infanticide, and St. Vincent de Paul
established his first children's institution after rescuing an infant from
a begger who was in the process of deforming its limbs.2 '
Yet these reform movements were manifestly inadequate, and legal
interdiction of the abandonment of children that was passed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was largely ineffective. During this
Golden Age of France, hungry orphans roamed and begged in the streets
of Paris, and a child lying dead in the streets was not uncommon.
Many cultures-not all primitive or ancient-have practiced forms
of child mutilation for a variety of religious, medical, cosmetic, or ecot1ld.
at 36.

11l3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA Infanticide 3 (9th ed. 1881).
'KADUSHIN 31. See also BAKAN 65. Some symbolic interpretations of fairy tales have been
made in connection with child abuse, abandonment, and exposure. It has been suggested, for
example, that Rock-a-Bye Baby and Humpty Dumpty are infanticidal poems and that London
Bridge suggests immuring a child in the foundation of the bridge. Cinderellaand Snow White depict
stepmothers who abuse children. Jack and the Beanstalk portrays a giant who would eat Jack.
Children (or child-like beings) are eaten by witches, bears, or wolves in such folk tales as The
Gingerbread Man, The Three Little Pigs, and Hanseland Gretel. See BAKAN 57-77.
2PAYNE 257-7 1.
21ld. at 306-11.
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nomic reasons. Mutilation of sex organs and castration was once common. Circumcision, derived from the ancient Jewish tradition, is still
performed despite its questionable medical value. Footbinding of girls
for aesthetic reasons was common in ancient China and continued until
recent times. The American Flathead Indians practiced cranial deformation, and the Solomon Islanders still do. Other forms of mutilation-gouged eyes, deformed feet, and amputated or twisted arms-were
inflicted on children in ancient Rome and later in England to evoke pity
so they could become successful beggers. 22
Most societies have permitted severe physical punishment of children by parents, teachers, and others acting in locoparentis.Such action
has been considered necessary to maintain discipline, to establish a proper atmosphere for teaching and learning, to satisfy religious imperatives, or to drive away evil spirits. "Spare the rod and spoil the child"
is a Biblical warning of the dangers of parental leniency. Sick children
were sometimes beaten for medical reasons to drive out the devil thought
to possess them. In India epileptic children were thrashed with a sacred
iron chain to expel the demon? Many historical figures have complained of their abuse during childhood. 2
Urbanization and the industrial revolution in England and then in
America led to other forms of child abuse in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries through the exploitation of child labor. The factory
system meant that children became an economic asset rather than a
complete financial burden to their parents. In England children as young
as five worked sixteen hours per day, sometimes with irons riveted
around their ankles to keep them from running away. Some were
starved, beaten, or maltreated in other ways, and many died from occupational diseases. When parents rebelled against these working conditions, pauper children from poorhouses without parental protection were
put to work in the mills. During this period children were often employed
as chimney-sweeps in English cities. Worked day and night, sometimes
hurried along by the master burning straw behind them, these children
"Radbill 5-6.
11Id. at 4.
2
For example, Lady Jane Grey, the sixteen-year-old who was queen of England for nine days,

was beheaded by Mary Tudor. 10

ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITrANICA

Grey, Lady Jane 883 (14th ed.

1929). Frederick the Great of Prussia ran away from home at age eighteen because he was often a
victim of his father's violent rages. 9 id. Frederick 11716.
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deteriorated both physically and mentally, being susceptible to "chimney sweep's cancer" (cancer of the scrotum) and tuberculosis. 25
The early philosophy of education also contributed to the harsh
treatment of children. Children had a duty to learn, and effective learning could occur only under repressive conditions. The Spartans had their
whip bearer, who had a high place in the educational system, and many
ancient philosophers beat their students unmercifully. Roman schoolmasters used whips made from the stalk of the giant fennel for punishment.26 Educational methods in England and America have fluctuated
between harsh use of the birch and restrictions limiting corporal punishment advocated by educational reformers.
ATTITUDES TOWARD CHILD CARE IN EARLY AMERICA

When the colonists came to the New World, they brought two parts
of the English legal system that continued to influence American thinking into the twentieth century: the common law rules of family government; and the traditions and child-care practices of the Elizabethan Poor
Law of 1601, including the idea that poverty was a sin. During this early
period children were separated from their parents by apprenticeship or
by placement in an institution primarily because of the poverty of the
parents. The early American practices in regard to dependent and orphaned children reflect the beginnings of governmental neglect of children that has continued to the present day.
Common Law of Family Government
Under the early English common law, the father was entitled to the
custody of his children as a matter of legal right. His right to custody
was considered absolute in some instances, regardless of the welfare of
the child. Under the common law as it developed in the colonies, the
father had a right to custody that was considered interrelated with his
duty to provide support, his obligation to discipline, and his right to the
child's services. The father's right to custody was not absolute, but it
was considered superior to the custody rights of the mother. On the
father's death his rights passed to her. z7
"PAYNE 312-31. See also Radbill 11-12.
"Radbill 4.
7These early legal principles are discussed with supporting case citations in an anonymous
editorial note, Custody and Control of Children, 5 WORDHAM L. REV. 460 (1936), reprintedin
SELECTED ESSAYS ON FAMILY LAW 607 (1950).
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Kent's lectures on the common law in 1827 summarized these common law principles of family government:
The rights of parents result from their duties. As they are bound to
maintain and educate their children, the law has given them a right to
such authority; and in the support of that authority, a right to the
exercise of such discipline as may be requisite for the discharge of their
sacred trust. This is the true foundation of parental power; and yet the
ancients generally carried the power of the parent to a most atrocious
extent over the person and liberty of the child. The Persians, Egyptians,
Greeks, Gauls, and Romans tolerated infanticide, and allowed to fathers a very absolute dominion over their offspring ....
The father (and on his death, the mother) is generally entitled to
the custody of the infant children, inasmuch as they are their natural
protectors, for maintenance and education. But the courts of justice
may, in their sound discretion, and when the morals, or safety, or
interests of the children strongly require it, withdraw the infants from
the custody of the father or mother, and place the care and custody of
them elsewhere . . . s
In the colonial family the father ruled over both his wife and his
children. Parental discipline of children was both severe and arbitrary.
Parents, teachers, and ministers believed in stern correction by the rod,
and they found support for this belief in the Bible, which was their
constant guide. Both the home and the school were considered appropriate places for "breaking and beating down" disobedient children. 2 9 Parents and teachers had a right to punish children in a "reasonable manner," and the seventeenth and eighteenth century concept of reasonableness was harsh. The courts rarely interfered with these disciplinary prac30
tices.
PoorLaw Concepts of Child Care
The English Poor Law tradition included the principle that dependJ. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 203-05 (11th ed. 1867), reprinted in I G.
THE CHILD AND THE STATE 51-52 (1938) and 1 CHILDREN AND YoUTH IN AMERICA: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 1600-1865, at 364 (R. Bremner ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as I CHILDREN
22

ABBOTr,

AND YOUTH].
"HoME AND CHILD LIFE IN COLONIAL DAYS

130 (S. Glubok ed. 1969). Connecticut and

Massachusetts had seventeenth century statutes prescribing the death penalty for rebellious chil-

dren. 1 CHILDREN AND
3See W.
(1869).

YOUTH

37-39.

TIFFANY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS

§ 123
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ence upon public funds for support should be as unattractive as possible
in order to discourage poverty. Children were not excepted from the
application of this principle. Because public funds were limited, care for
dependent or orphaned children was provided at the least possible cost.
In colonial America the responsibility of a town or country to pay
for the care of an abandoned or orphaned child was based on the parents' legal settlement, which was usually acquired by one year's residence. Counties and towns were careful to avoid the responsibility for
placement or support of a child who had legal settlement elsewhere.
Thus, if relief was requested or if a child required placement because of
a family crisis, the family or child was returned to the county or town
of legal settlement.31
The two primary methods of child care for dependent or orphaned
children were apprenticeship to a master by indenture-a contract that
contained the terms of the placement-and placement in almshouses or
poorhouses, where children were mixed indiscriminately with adult out32
casts-paupers and insane and mentally retarded persons.
The use of apprenticeships was the primary method of child care
during the first one hundred years of colonial America. This approach
was suited to a pioneer society in which life was hard, labor was scarce,
and children were expected to be useful. An apprenticeship served several
purposes. It provided a foster home without cost, for the master agreed
to furnish care in return for the child's services. It also provided education and training, for the master agreed in the indenture to teach the
child to read or,-perhaps, to train him in a trade. Yet children from poor
families were frequently apprenticed by the authorities, sometimes over
the objections of their parents. Apprenticeships were used by magistrates
to secure family placements for children whose parents were unable to
provide suitable homes or allowed them to grow up in idleness and
ignorance. While the colonists were concerned about the welfare of dependent and orphaned children, the early records show that the desire
or necessity for economy overrode all other considerations.
During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, infants
3See 1 CHILDREN

AND YOUTH 262. For some interesting North Carolina cases that illustrate

the significance of legal settlement in determining legal responsibility for a child see Commissioners
of the County of Barbe v. Commissioners of the County of Buncombe, 101 N.C. 520, 8 S.E. 176
(1888); State v. Elam, 61 N.C. 460 (1868); Ferrell v. Boykin, 61 N.C. 9 (1866).

3'See 1 CHILDREN
3Id. at 64.

AND

YOUTH 64-71.
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were usually cared for in their own homes through "outdoor relief" or
boarded at public expense, provided they could meet the strict requirements of legal settlement and eligibility. During this period these methods largely supplanted the use of apprenticeships for very young children. In an economy that used slaves, few masters were willing to care
for infants whose labor was not worth the trouble of providing such care.
Thus, poor children were apprenticed beginning at eight years of age. In
some areas, under a system that verged on slavery, both child and adult
paupers were auctioned off to the lowest bidder under the vendue method
of pauper relief. As a result, they were turned over to the person who
would care for them for the least cost in public funds.34
The opening of the nineteenth century found the poor-law system
of child care-in the almshouse, by outdoor relief, or through apprenticeships-well established in the sixteen states of the union." A shocking number of poor and orphaned children received care in almshouses
between 1800 and 1875, where they mingled with adult paupers, the
insane and the mentally retarded, and persons suffering from venereal
disease. Though the reformers of the 1840's, including Dorothea Dix,
condemned the indiscriminate mixing of children in these institutions,
the number of children in almshouses increased from year to year.
Around 1866, the states began to enact legislation to move children from
almshouses, but the separation was slow.36 The census of 1880 showed
that 7,770 children between the ages of two and sixteen were in almshouses in the United States-fifteen per every 100,000 persons in the
general population. By 1890 this figure was reduced to 4,987, or eight
per.every 100,000.37
Poor children-whether supported at home by "outdoor relief' or
placed in almshouses or separate orphan asylums-were usually apprenmid. at 262-8 1.
5See E. LUNDBERG, UNTO THE LEAST OF THESE 49-50 (1947) [hereinafter cited as LUNDBERG].
See also H. FOLKS, THE CARE OF DESTITUTE, NEGLECTED, AND DEPENDENT CHILDREN 1-I1 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as FOLKS].
Ul CHILDREN AND YOUTH 631-32. See also 2 G. AnnoBr, THE CHILD AND THE STATE 7 (1938)
which notes:
Reform came slowly in view of the evidence of the serious conditions in the almshouses
because public funds had been invested in land and buildings and because of the fatal
ease with which children and families could be placed in an almshouse. Moreover, as
the number of children in almshouses was large, the problem of what to do with them if
this form of care were abandoned was not easily solved. It was not until the last quarter
of the nineteenth century that the laws prohibiting this type of care were passed.
1See FOLKS 80.
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ticed when they reached an age that was suitable to farmers, tradesmen,
sea captains, or housewives. An apprenticed child was often alluded to
as representing loneliness, neglect, overwork, and awareness of low esteem. While this system had some merit in that it provided a certain
amount of education and training, in its worst form certain of its features (particularly the recapture of run-away apprentices) were reminiscent of slavery. Apprenticed children generally received little protection
or attention from public authorities. Some state laws contained provisions intended to offer more protection to apprenticed children (such as
a requirement that the overseers of the poor determine whether the terms
of the indenture were observed by the master), but these laws were not
generally enforced. In a few instances overseers of the poor bound children to work in factories, but apprenticeships for this purpose were more
common in England than in America. After 1875 apprenticeships were
3
not often used as a method of care for poor and orphaned children. 1
Institutional care of dependent children was thought to be the preferable method of care by the mid-nineteenth century, particularly in
separate orphan asylums. By 1830 an embryonic reform movement had
begun, and the growing number of orphanages provided an alternative
to almshouse care of children. These orphan asylums were supported by
both private and public funds. Since the care of dependent children in
almshouses and through "outdoor relief" had been considered a public
responsibility, it was natural that government continued to share the cost
of child care in orphan asylums under private sponsorship. The most
common method of financing was by per capita payments from public
funds for each child in care. This practice tended to encourage the development of large orphan asylums that kept children in care for long
periods of time while discouraging the development of foster-family
placements as a method of child care.3 9

Early Cases
Perhaps the earliest recorded child-abuse case was decided in Massachusetts in 1655. It involved a master's maltreatment of an apprentice
named John Walker, age twelve, who died as a result. The description
2'l CHILDREN AND YOUTH

262-67, 572-83.

13FOLKS 72-81, 115-49. See also I CHILDREN AND YOUTH 631-33.
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of the child's injuries sounds contemporary:
[T]he body ... was blackish and blue, and the skin broken in divers
places from the middle to the hair of his head, viz., all his back with
stripes given him by his master . . . [with] a bruise of his left arm, and
one of his left hip, and one great bruise of his breast. . . . [T]he flesh
was much broken of the knees . . .[H]e did want sufficient food and

clothing and lodging, and. . . the said John did constantly wet his bed
and his clothes, lying in them, and so suffered by it, his clothes being
frozen about him . .. [that] in respect of cruelty and hard usage he
died. . . and. . . the dead corpse did bleed at the nose.4"

The master was convicted of manslaughter and ordered "burned in the
hand," and all of his goods were confiscated. Two other Massachusetts
cases decided in 1675 and 1678 show children being removed from their
parents by the courts because the homes were considered unsuitable."
Few reported cases decided before the eighteenth century deal with
the civil and criminal liability of parents who were too harsh in disciplining their children.4" It was well established at common law that a minor
child could not sue his parents in tort. Thus, the courts developed the
general rule that a parent could not be held liable in a civil suit for
excessive or brutal punishment of his children. The courts reasoned that
an orderly society depended on parents having discretion in disciplining
within the home in order to maintain domestic harmony and family
government. In an 1891 case, the Mississippi court said: "The state,
through its criminal laws, will give the minor child protection from
parental violence and wrongdoing, and this is all the child can be heard
to demand."4
The few reported early criminal cases indicate that the criminal law
provided very little protection to children from parental cruelty. Parents
were considered immune from criminal prosecution except when the
punishment was grossly unreasonable in relation to the offense, when the
parents inflicted cruel and merciless punishment, or when the punishment permanently injured the child. The legal presumption of the courts
4'1CHILDREN AND YOUTH

123-24.

41d. at 41-42.
4rfhese early cases are summarized in McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation,
in SELECTED ESSAYS ON FAMILY LAW 421-23 (1950).
aHewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 711, 9 So. 885, 887 (1891).
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was generally in favor of the reasonableness of parental action."
The leading criminal case of the mid-nineteenth century arose in
Tennessee, where a child's parents were prosecuted for excessive punishment. 5 The evidence showed that the mother had struck the child with
her fists and had pushed her head against a wall and that the parents
had whipped her with a cowskin, tied her to a bedpost with a rope for
two hours, and switched her. The court reversed the parents' conviction,
holding that whether the punishment was excessive was a question of fact
for the jury to decide rather than a question of law. Without citing any
case authority, the court said
The right of parents to chastise their refractory and disobedient
children is so necessary to the government of families, to the good order
of society, that no moralist or lawgiver has ever thought of interfering
with its existence, or of calling upon them to account for the manner
of its exercise, upon light or frivolous pretences. But, at the same time
that the law has created and preserved this right, in its regard for the
safety of the child it has prescribed bounds beyond which it shall not
be carried.
In chastising a child, the parent must be careful that he does not
exceed the bounds of moderation and inflict cruel and merciless punishment; if he do, he is a trespasser, and liable to be punished by indictment. It is not, then, the infliction of punishment, but the excess, which
constitutes the offence, and what this excess shall be is not a conclusion
46
of law, but a question of fact for the determination of the jury.
An interesting criminal-exposure case arose in 1864 in Boston,
where a woman was prosecuted and convicted for leaving a two-day-old
girl at a doorstep in mid-winter. The defendant acted with the consent
of the father but presumably without the knowledge of the mother, who
later identified the child. Although the indictment was defective for improperly alleging criminal exposure or neglect, the conviction was sus47
tained on the basis of a criminal assault on the child.
"See

TIFFANY, supra note 30, § 123,

at 246. See also J.

MADDEN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW

OF PERSONS AND DoMEsTIc RELATIONS 446-49 (1931).
4

Johnson v. State, 21 Tenn. 282 (1840).

111d. at 283.
TCommonwealth v. Stoddard, 91 Mass. (9 Alien) 280 (1864).
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THE REFORM MOVEMENT

Early Efforts
Before the nineteenth century courts and public authorities rarely
intervened in family life to protect children from parental neglect or
abuse except when poor children were apprenticed or placed in
almshouses. Beginning around 1825, it became gradually recognized
that public authorities had a duty to intervene in cases of parental neglect. These early efforts were considered more preventive than protective,
since they were aimed at preventing neglected children from entering a
life of crime and becoming a threat to the state.4"
The first child-saving efforts were institutional-the "Refuge"
movement. 49 The New York House of Refuge was organized by a private
corporation in 1824 and opened in 1825, thus becoming the first juvenile
reformatory in the United States. Similar institutions were founded in
Philadelphia in 1826, in Boston in 1826 (the first public institution, for
the New York and Philadelphia Houses of Refuge were established by
private corporations that received public funds), in New Orleans in 1845,
and in Rochester and Baltimore in 1849. The laws authorized the courts
to commit neglected, destitute, abandoned, and vagrant children to the
houses of refuge along with child offenders. 0
New York City took the leadership in developing other child-saving
efforts during this period. A new type of institution-the New York
Juvenile Asylum-was organized in 1851 to receive poor and neglected
children who were placed there by their parents or by court commitment.51
There were also anti-institutional influences. In the mid-nineteenth
century, the Reverend Charles Loring Brace, a New York minister,
became concerned with the vagrant, homeless street children of the city,
whom he called the "dangerous classes."-" Strongly opposed to any
form of institutional care for children, whether in almshouses or separate
orphan asylums, Brace organized a child-placement program that
stressed free foster placements in the country to prevent these street
children from growing up into a life of crime in the city. In 1853 he
8

' FOLKs 169.
4

'Id.at 198-226. See also 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH 674-95; LUNDBERG 66.
170-71, 201.
"Id.,at 61-62; 1CHILDREN AND YOUTH 735-37.
'21CHILDREN AND YOUTH 757; FOLKS 66. See also I CHILDREN AND YOUTH 669.
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organized the New York Children's Aid Society, which was soon followed by similar children's aid societies in other cities (1860 in Baltimore, 1865 in Boston, 1866 in Brooklyn, and 1882 in Philadelphia). The
final phase of his program of "moral disinfection" was to send boys and
girls to the West to be placed in free foster homes provided by farmers;
he did not use apprenticeships.5 Between 1854 and 1875 Brace and his
workers placed an average of one thousand children per year in western
homes. They came from newsboys' lodging houses, orphan and infant
asylums, almshouses, and directly from parents. Brace was so convinced
of the rightness of his approach that he urged his workers to use persuasion and high-pressure salesmanship so that children could be deported
from the city to the country. The result was that many poor children
were separated from their families. These children were sometimes
adopted, but many of these hasty and haphazard placements were unhappy.54
The New York Foundling Asylum was established in 1869. This55
institution received 1,392 foundlings during 1873, many of whom died.
At this time some thirty organizations in the city were concerned with
children in need of help.
Mary Ellen
The last quarter of the nineteenth century was one of those periods
in history when public interest in child abuse and neglect was high, and,
this interest led to the organization of specialized "cruelty" societies to
protect children. It is significant that the first specialized groups to
prevent cruelty were organized in behalf of animals. The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was organized in New
York City in 1866 by Henry Bergh, who was its president in 1874 when
a church worker sought his help in behalf of a child named Mary Ellen
Wilson.5" Using the legal adviser to the ASPCA, Elbridge T. Gerry, as
his lawyer, Bergh initiated court action to protect the child. The case
attracted wide public attention through the press, and, as a result, Gerry
01 CHILDREN AND YOUTH

632; FOLKs 66-67; LUNDBERG 78-79.
"KADUSHIN 359.
"Radbill 10. The Medical Register of New York for 1873 reported that during the year 122
infants were found dead in such places as the streets, alleys, and rivers of the city.
"12 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AmERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 1866-1932, at 185 (R.
Bremner ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH].
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organized the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children in the same year.17 Some historical and legal confusion has resulted
from the close relationship between leaders of the animal and childprotection movements in connection with this case. The myth of Mary
Ellen is an appealing story that often appears in child-protection literature, and it points up the new emphasis on child protection at the end
of the last century. The facts regarding Mary Ellen, however, document
the state of governmental neglect in the mid-nineteenth century childplacement and supervision practices and show the clear relationship
between these practices and this child's maltreatment.
The myth goes something like this: The child-protection movement
began in the United States in 1875 when the Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals intervened in a child-abuse case involving Mary
Ellen, age nine, whose foster parents treated her with shocking brutality.
Since there were no laws to protect children, the case was brought to
court on the theory that the child was a member of the animal kingdom
and thus entitled to protection from the same laws that were intended
to protect animals. The child was removed from her foster parents and
placed with the church worker who had initially brought the case to the
Society's attention.5
The historical facts are as follows: The case arose in 1874, when
Mary Ellen probably was ten years old. Laws to protect children (criminal laws forbidding assault and statutes dealing with the neglect of children) were not lacking but were not enforced systematically. The case
was not brought into court by the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals on the theory that this child was entitled to the legal protection afforded animals; rather, it was initiated by the founder of this
society acting as an individual, using the Society's attorney, by a petition
for a writ de homine replegiando,59 on the basis of which the court issued
a special warrant to bring the child before the court. Mary Ellen was
not placed with the church worker but instead was placed temporarily
uId. at 189-90.
"The myth of Mary Ellen appears in a number of sources in child-welfare literature. The most
recent is Mulford, Protective Services for Children, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL WORK
Protective Services for Children 1007 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Mulford]. See also KADUSHiN 206;
LUNDBERG 103; Radbill 13.
"According to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 480 (4th ed. 1957), this was an old English writ of
law directed to remove the custody of one person from another. The use of this writ is discussed in
PAYNE 336.
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(exactly where is unknown) for seven months pending efforts to locate
relatives; when none could be found, she was committed to the "Sheltering Arms," an orphan asylum."
Various issues of the New York Times during April 1874 summarize the evidence presented in the several court hearings that involved this
case: Mary Ellen Wilson, an infant girl whose birth date apparently was
unknown, was left at the office of the Superintendent of Outdoor Poor,
Department of Charities, New York City, on May 21, 1864, by a woman
who had cared for the child while she received eight dollars per month
for her support. When the support stopped, she turned the child over to
the Department. When Mary Ellen was eighteen months old, she was
apprenticed to Mary and Thomas McCormack under an indenture that
required the foster parents to teach her that there was a God, and what
it meant to lie, and to instruct her "in the art and mystery of housekeeping." The indenture also required the foster parents to report to the
Department annually on the child's condition. The placement was made
on January 2, 1866, and the indenture was signed on February 15. When
the placement was made, the Department checked with one reference-Mrs. McCormack's physician. Unbeknown to the Department of
Public Charities, Mary Ellen Wilson was actually the illegitimate child
of Thomas McCormack by a "good-for-nothing" woman whose name
was unknown.
The case arose in 1874, when Mary Ellen was about ten years old.
By that time Thomas McCormack had died and Mary McCormack had
married Francis Connolly. Mary Ellen could not remember having lived
with anyone other than the Connollys. She believed that her parents were
dead; she did not know her exact age; and she called Mrs. Connally
"Mamma." She could not recall ever having been kissed by anyone.
The Superintendent of Outdoor Poor, who had made the placement, testified that he could remember nothing about the case except
what was contained in his written record, since he had placed five
hundred children through his department during 1874. Clearly, the Department of Charities had lost contact with Mary Ellen and the Connollys, as only two of the required annual reports on the child's condition
had been made between 1866 and 1874.
The evidence indicated both abuse and neglect: Mrs. Connolly had
whipped Mary Ellen almost every day with a cane and a twisted whip-a
"CHILDREN AND YOUTH

189.
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rawhide that left black and blue marks-and had struck her with a pair
of scissors (which were produced in court) that had cut her on the
forehead; the child was locked in the bedroom whenever "Mama" left
home; she was not allowed to leave the room where the Connollys were;
she was not allowed to play outside or with other children; and she was
inadequately clothed and slept on a piece of rug on the floor.
Mrs. Connolly was prosecuted under indictments for felonious assault with a pair of scissors on April 7, 1874, and for a series of assaults
during 1873 and 1874. The jury found her guilty of assault and battery
and sentenced her to one year in the penitentiary at hard labor."
The New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
The philosophy and purpose of the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NYSPCC) was shaped by its lawyerfounder in the aftermath of public indignation over the case of Mary
Ellen. Elbridge T. Gerry found that there were a number of agencies that
served dependent and orphaned children and institutions that provided
placements. However, he noted that there were no agencies with the
specific purpose to seek out and rescue neglected or abused children.
Gerry found the police and the courts too busy to give the time and
attention required to deal properly with cases that involved the exercise
by parents of their legal right to control their children."2
The NYSPCC soon acquired police powers and enormous influence
over the lives of the children whom it rescued. It was organized as a
private group in 1874 and later incorporated under legislation that authorized cruelty societies to file complaints for the violation of any laws
affecting children and that required law enforcement and court officials
to aid agents of the societies in the enforcement of these laws. 63 The
NYSPCC addressed itself to these tasks with vigor. It placed agents in
all magistrates' courts to investigate cases involving destitute, neglected,
or wayward children. These agents advised magistrates concerning when
children should be committed and to which institution. During its first
year the NYSPCC dealt with seventy-two children, most of whom were
"These news stories are reprinted in 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH 185-89. The facts contained in
these stories have been summarized and reorganized to clarify the sequence of events and the
relationship between the poor child-placement practices of this'period (particularly the lack of any
contact and supervision on the part of the public agency) and the child's maltreatment.
122CHILDREN AND YOUTH 189-92.

Ch. 130, [1875] N.Y. Laws 114, reprintedin 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH 192-93.
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committed to institutions." In 1876 it was influential in securing legislation to prevent the employment of children in certain types of public
entertainment (singing and dancing) and to forbid begging.15 Further
legislation in 1881 gave impetus to its law-enforcement approach by
giving the Society's agents the power of arrest and by making it a
misdemeanor for anyone to interfere with or obstruct the Society in the
performance of its children's work.66
Within ten years the NYSPCC attained significant power over the
lives of families in the city. Though institutions and orphan asylums had
the legal authority to discharge children by apprenticeship, adoption, or
return to parents, they were reluctant to do so without consulting the
Society, which they perceived to have the real power. By 1890 the
NYSPCC controlled the reception, care, and disposition of an average
of fifteen thousand destitute, neglected, and wayward children in New
York City at an average annual expenditure of 1,500,000 dollars for
their support.6" The Society's vigorous law enforcement methods greatly
increased the number of children who received institutional care in orphan asylums and who became wards of public or private charities.
However, their methods tended to discourage adoption or family foster
placements. During 1900 the Society placed six children in homes, but
2,407 children were committed to institutions on its recommendations.
The Society's influence did much to strengthen and perpetuate the per
capita or subsidy system of child support in sectarian institutions
through public funds.6"
Divergence in Philosophy of Child Protection
The organization of the NYSPCC was followed by the establishment of similar societies in other cities between 1875 and 1900. In many
instances, societies originally incorporated to protect animals added the
child-protection function. In others, humane societies were organized for
both purposes. Some twenty "cruelty" societies confined their activities
to child protection. In 1887 the societies for the protection of animals
"2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH 192-93.
"See 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH 193.
"Ch. 676, § 293, [1881] N.Y. Laws 72, reprinted in 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH 195.
"This estimate is given in FOLKS 175. The author of this article interprets the figure to mean
that an average of fifteen thousand children at any given time were under the supervision of the
NYSPCC.
-Id. at 176.
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organized the American Humane Association (AHA); cruelty societies
devoted exclusively to children were not admitted to the AHA until
1887. By 1900 161 societies in the United States were devoted to
protecting children or animals or both.69
Almost from the beginning, the "cruelty" societies that were devoted exclusively to children had a conflict in their philosophies of child
protection.7 The NYSPCC, having been organized first, became the
model for the law-enforcement approach to child rescue, with its agents
exercising police powers under legislative authority. This approach
seemed punitive to some reformers since it often separated children from
their parents and emphasized the prosecution of parents, who were often
punished by jail or prison sentences. Other child-protection groups in
Massachusetts and Philadelphia did not approve of the tendency of
anticruelty societies to become arms of the police. They were concerned
about preventive, remedial, and economic efforts that would strengthen
the home so that a child might remain with his parents. These early
disagreements provided the seeds for the growth and development of
contemporary thinking on effective methods of child protection. The
modern social-work approach to protection -protective services-tends
to avoid this punitive approach, but these differences in concept and
philosophy have continued into the twentieth century. 71
After the period of rapid development of private protective societies
for children in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries came a
period of decline in public interest. Gradually, however, the lawenforcement approach was replaced by the concept of protective services,
which was aimed at strengthening the child's own home. Child protection became the legal responsibility of public agencies under federal and
state legislation. The first White House Conference on Children in 1909
promoted the idea that a child should not be removed from his own
home due to poverty alone and that service and economic programs
should be designed to protect that home rather than to prosecute the
parents and rerriove the child. This thinking received support from the
emerging professions of child psychology and social work, which
"Id. at 172-73. See 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH 201-02; A. PLATr, THE CHILD SAVERs/THE
INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 108-09 [hereinafter cited as PLATrT] (1969).
"See FOLKS 173-78; 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH 207-08,214-16; Mulford.
1
KADUSHIN 202-56. For a contemporary view of the present operations of the Philadelphia
SPCC, now called the Society to Protect Children see L. RIcHErTE, THE THROWAWAY CHILDREN
80-100 (1969).
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stressed the importance of the child's home in his development.
The growth of private societies peaked around 1922, with fiftyseven SPCC's and 307 humane societies that were interested in both
children and animals. By 1942 the Humane Directory of the American
Humane Association listed only thirty-seven agencies using the name
"Prevention of Cruelty to Children," along with the 158 humane societies directed toward the prevention of cruelty to both animals and children. The number of SPCC groups has declined since 1942 because of
lack of public interest, funding problems, mergers with other organizations, and the assumption of child-protection services by public agencies.72 Between 1956 and 1967, the number of states in which private
agencies sponsored protective services for children dropped from sixteen
73
to ten.
The Mother's Aid movement in the United States between 1910 and
1930 preceded the Aid to Dependent Children program under the Social
Security Act of 1935 which offered federal funds to the states on a
matching basis for the support of needy children in their own homes
when one parent was disabled, absent, dead, or in prison. The Act also
fostered the growth of protective programs for children in the states by
providing federal funding for the care of "children who [were] dependent, neglected, or in danger of becoming delinquent." 74 The 1960
Golden Anniversary White House Conference on Children and Youth
recommended that the states enact legislation requiring that social agencies receive complaints of child neglect and provide services to parents
and children. The 1962 amendments to the Social Security Act required
each state to develop a plan to extend child welfare services, including
protective services, to every political subdivision. 75
PARENS PATRIAE-THE EMERGING RIGHT OF THE STATE TO INTERVENE

In the twentieth century the subject of child neglect and protection
is usually considered within the framework of the juvenile court, since
the court's statutory jurisdiction traditionally includes children alleged
72

See KADUSHIN 206-07. See also Mulford.
"Felder, A Lawyer's View of Child Abuse, 29 PUB.WELFARE 181, 187 (197 1).
7142 U.S.C. §§ 601-26 (1970). These developments are discussed in KADUSHIN 123-24, 207.
7-42 U.S.C. § 625.
Child welfare services are defined to include "preventing or remedying, or assisting in the solution
of problems which may result in, the neglect, abuse, exploitation, or delinquency of children." 42
U.S.C. § 625 (1970). See also Felder, supra note 73, at 187.
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to be neglected. It is important to remember that neglect statutes long
antedated the first juvenile court, which was established in 1899. These
early statutes were adopted by state legislatures beginning around 1825
as a part of the social reform movement to remove children from prisons, jails, and almshouses. The various names of these early institutions-houses of refuge, reform or industrial schools-likewise suggested a different emphasis in program. These early laws reflected the
bias of the period toward institutional care of poor or neglected children
and child offenders as a way to prevent them from growing up into a
life of crime and to protect them from the evils of urban life and an
industrialized society.
The nineteenth-century statutory definitions of children who were
subject to institutional commitment were broadly worded under the
aegis of the social reform movement. For example, 1875 Wisconsin
legislation authorized the commitment of boys under age twelve and
girls less than sixteen to industrial schools for indeterminate periods
during minority:
[A child is subject to commitment who] is begging or receiving alms,
whether actually, or under pretense of selling or offering for sale anything, or being in any public street or place for the purpose of begging
or receiving alms; or that is found wandering and not having any home
or settled place of abode, proper guardianship, or means of subsistence;
or is found destitute either by being an orphan or having a parent or
parents who is undergoing imprisonment, or otherwise; or that frequents the company of reputed thieves or of lewd, wanton or lascivious
persons in speech or behavior, or notorious resorts of bad characters;
or that is found wandering in streets, alleys or public places, and belonging to that class of children called "ragpickers" or that is an
inmate of any house of ill fame or poor house, whether in company
with its parent or parents or otherwise; or who has been abandoned in
any way by his parent or parents or guardians; or who is without means
of subsistence, or support. 6
These early statutes tended to blur the distinctions between poor and
neglected children and child offenders, and the terms that they used were
later incorporated in juvenile court legislation with different meanings.
7Ch. 325, § 5, [1875] Wise. Laws 633, quoted in Milwaukee Indus. School v. Supervisors of

Milwaukee County, 40 Wis. 328, 334-35 (1876). Some states still have legislation of this type. See
Note, Child Neglect: Due Processfor the Parent,70 COLUM. L. REv. 465,467 n. 15 (1970).
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Consequently, the child legally classified as "dependent" in the nineteenth century would be defined as "neglected" under many twentiethcentury juvenile court statutes.
These early statutes typically provided for institutional commitments of children under summary procedures before minor judicial officials (magistrates, justices of the peace, or municipal courts), sometimes
without a hearing or notice to the parents. 77 The child was usually committed until age twenty-one, with the institutional authorities having
discretion to place the child during his minority by indenture, in a foster
home, or with his parents.
The constitutionality of these nineteenth-century laws was challenged on a number of grounds: the broad definitions of those children
who were subject to commitment; the fact that both neglected children
and child offenders were subject to commitment and to the same institutions; and on procedural due process of law. With few exceptions these
early neglect statutes were found to be constitutional, partly because of
the social desirability of placing children in institutions separate from
adults. The primary legal rationale for the decisions was the ancient
doctrine of parenspatriae,which had been adopted from English chancery law to justify the state's assumption of a protective parental role
that infringed upon traditional notions of the rights of parents and due
process of law. These early decisions reflect the courts' struggles to
balance competing rights-the traditional rights of parents to the care,
custody, and control of their children and the right of the state to intervene in family government to protect children from parental neglect and
social evils. In these decisions one also sees the beginnings of judicial
struggles to define what constitutes a reasonable standard of parental
care under the broad and subjective standards of the statutes of this
period.
Early Cases
An early case involved the commitment of an incorrigible girl to the
Philadelphia House of Refuge by a justice of the peace on the complaint
of her mother." Her father sought her release, alleging that the statute
which established the House of Refuge was unconstitutional because it
authorized commitment without a jury trial. The court found the legisla7See State ex rel. Olson v. Brown, 50 Minn. 353, 52 N.W. 935 (1892).
73Exparte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1839).
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tion constitutional, using parenspatriaeas its rationale:
The House of Refuge is not a prison, but a school. Where reformation, and not punishment, is the end, it may indeed be used as a prison
for juvenile convicts who would else be committed to a common goal;
and in respect to these, the constitutionality of the act which incorporated. it, stands, clear of controversy. . . . The object of the charity is
reformation, by training its inmates to industry; by imbuing their
minds with principles of morality and religion; by furnishing them with
means to earn a living; and, above all, by separating them from the
corrupting influence of improper associates. To this end may not the
natural parents, when unequal to the task of education, or unworthy
of it, be superseded by the parenspatriae,or common guardian of the
community? It is to be remembered that the public has a paramount
interest in the virtue and knowledge of its members, and that of strict
right, the business of education belongs to it. That parents are ordinarily intrusted with it is because it can seldom be put into better hands;
but where they are incompetent or corrupt, what is there to prevent the
public from withdrawing their faculties, held, as they obviously are, at
its sufferance? The right of parental control is a natural, but not an
unalienable one. It is not excepted by the declaration of rights out of
the subjects of ordinary legislation . . ..
Several later cases involved commitments of children because of
poverty and neglect. The consfitutionality of the legislation under which
a number of young children (ranging in age from three to nine years who
had been inmates of the county poorhouse) were committed to the Milwaukee Industrial School was attacked as "punishment of poverty as a
crime" and imprisonment without due process of law."0 The court upheld the commitments and the constitutionality of the legislation, relying
onparenspatriaeand comparing the state and its school to a parent:
Parental authority implies restraint, not imprisonment. And every
school must necessarily exercise some measure of the parental power
of restraint over children committed to it. And when the state, as
parenspatriae,is compelled by the misfortune of a child to assume for
it parental duty, and to charge itself with its nurture, it is compelled
also to assume parental authority over it. This authority must necessarily be delegated to those to whom the state delegates the nurture and
education of the child. The state does not. . . introduce this assump7

1d. at 11.
"Milwaukee Indus. School v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County, 40 Wis. 328, 330 (1876).
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tion of authority between parent and child standing in no need of it. It
assumes it only upon the destitution and necessity of the child, arising
from want or default of parents.8"
A broadly worded Massachusetts statute of 188282 authorized the commitment of various types of neglected children to the overseers of the
poor under summary procedures without a trial or notice to the parents.
In a case in which a four-year-old girl had been committeed to the
overseers of the poor due to the father's neglect, both the summary
procedures and the commitment were upheld on the basis of parens
patriae:
This is not a penal statute, and the commitment to the public officers
is not in the nature of punishment. It is a provision by the Commonwealth, as parenspatriae, for the custody and care of neglected children, and is intended to supply to them the parental custody which they
have lost .

. .

. It does not punish the infant by confinement, nor

deprive him of his liberty; it only recognizes and regulates, as in providing for guardianship and apprenticeship, the parental custody which is
an incident of infancy.8
The New Hampshire Supreme Court, on the other hand, refused to
follow the majority view in an 1885 case involving two brothers, ages
sixteen and thirteen, who were committed to industrial school for specified terms (three and two years) by a justice of the peace under an
unusual statute that authorized such commitments in a probable cause
"Id. at 338.
-Ch. 181, § 3, [1882] Mass. Acts & Res. 135, quoted in Farnham v. Pierce, 141 Mass. 203,
203-04 (1886):
Whenever it shall be made to appear to any court or magistrate that within his
jurisdiction any child under fourteen years of age, by reason of orphanage, or of the
neglect, crime, drunkenness or other vice of his parents, is growing up without education
or salutary control, and in circumstances exposing him to lead an idle and dissolute life,
or is dependent upon public charity, such court or magistrate shall, after notice to the
state board of health, lunacy and charity, commit such child, if he has no known
settlement in this Commonwealth, to the custody of said board, and if he has known
settlement then to the overseers of the poor of the city or town in which he has such
settlement, except in the city of Boston, and if he has a settlement in said city, then to
the directors of public institutions of said city until he arrives at the age of twenty-one
years, or for any less time; and the said board, overseers and directors are authorized to
make all needful arrangements for the care and maintenance of-children so committed
in some state, municipal or town institution, or in some respectable family, and to
discharge such children from their custody whenever the object of their commitment has
been accomplished.
8
Farnham v. Pierce, 141 Mass. 203, 204 (1886).
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hearing on a felony charge in lieu of posting bond for trial.u The statute
was ruled unconstitutional in authorizing commitments without trial or
conviction, since it deprived the youths of their right to jury trial. The
court strongly criticized an Ohio decision upholding the commitment of
a child to a house of refuge in which the proceedings had been conducted
in secret without the knowledge or consent of the parents:
The liberty of the minor during the term of his minority, which might
be for a period of many years, was made to depend upon the deliberations of a secret tribunal. A judgment rendered upon such an exparte
hearing is as little calculated to command the respect of the community
as the proceedings of the ancient court of star chamber.85
Illinois Cases

The Illinois legislation that authorized institutional commitment of
neglected children and the cases that interpreted these laws have both
social and legal significance. These nineteenth-century laws reflect the
sequential development of institutions under various names in which
neglected children were mixed with child offenders. The cases reflect
early differences over the meaning ofparenspatriaeand its use to justify
state interference in family life. The concept of parenspatriae had become established in judicial precedent in Illinois by the time the juvenile
court was established in Chicago in 1899.86

The Chicago Reform School was organized in 1855. The legislation
that defined its authority authorized justices of the peace to commit two
,"State ex rel. Cunningham v. Ray, 63 N.H. 406 (1885).
9Id. at 411.

"Reforms in the public care of dependent children in Illinois were somewhat slower than in
the eastern states. Around 1850 private organizations and "rescue" societies began to supplement

the almshouse system of child care. By 1875, however, Illinois had fallen behind the eastern states
in adopting legislation to require removal of children.

The child-saving activities in Chicago followed patterns that had developed earlier in the
eastern states. The Illinois Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals intervened in 1877
(three years after the case of Mary Ellen in New York City) in behalf of a child named Harry, age
six, who was physically abused and neglected by his stepmother. In 1881 the Society changed its

name to the Illinois Humane Society when it discovered that it was devoting two-thirds of its time
to the investigation of cases involving cruelty to children and to the prosecution of parents. Illinois
supported the activities of these private groups with public funds by enacting legislation in 1885,
which provided that fines collected from the prosecution of cases involving cruelty to animals and
children would be used for these agencies' support. Act of June 23, 1885, [1885] II1. Laws 200. See
2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH 201-02; A. PL.ATT, Tm CHILD SAVERs/THE INvrloN OF DELINQUENCY
108-09 (1969) [hereinafter cited as PLATT].
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categories of children between the ages of six and sixteen: criminal law
violators and a child who "is a vagrant, or is destitute of proper parental
care, or is growing up in mendicancy, ignorance, idleness or vice." 87 This
broad commitment authority was challenged in a case involving Daniel
O'Connell, age fourteen, who was committed to the Chicago Reform
School in September 1870.8 Although the facts of the case were not
stated, the court concluded that he had been committed under the general statutory authority to arrest and confine for "misfortune" under
the second category above. In a scathing attack on parens patriae,the
court ordered his release on the grounds that commitment of a poor or
neglected child who had committed no crime violated his constitutional
rights. In strong words, the court discussed parental fights and the
difficulty of defining a proper standard of parental care and reviewed
the power of the father under Roman law:
What is proper parental care? The best and kindest parents would
differ, in the attempt to solve the question. No two scarcely agree; and
when we consider the watchful supervision, which is so unremitting
over the domestic affairs of others, the conclusion is forced upon us,
that there is not a child in the land who could not be proved, by two
or more witnesses, to be in this sad condition. Ignorance, idleness, vice,
are relative terms .

. .

. Vice is a very comprehensive term. Acts,

wholly innocent in the estimation of many good men, would, according
to the code of ethics of others, show fearful depravity. What is the
standard to be? ....
The parent has the right to the care, custody and assistance of his
child. The duty to maintain and protect it, is a principle of natural law
... . Another branch of parental duty, strongly inculcated by writers
on natural law, is the education of children. To aid in the performance
of these duties, and enforce obedience, parents have authority over
them. The municipal law should not disturb this relation, except for
the strongest reasons. .

.

. Before any abridgement of the right, gross

misconduct or almost total unfitness on the part of the parent, should
be clearly proved. ...
But even the power of the parent must be exercised with moderation. He may use correction and restraint, but in a reasonable manner.
He has the right to enforce only such discipline, as may be necessary
to the discharge of his sacred trust; only moderate correction and
-Ch. 14 § 8, [1863] Ill. Priv. Laws 134. See PLATr 102-07; People ex rel. O'Connell v. Turner,
55 Ill. 280 (1870).
uPeople ex rel. O'Connell v. Turner, 55 11. 280 (1870).
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temporary confinement. We are not governed by the twelve tables,
which formed the Roman law. The fourth table gave fathers the power
of life and death, and of sale, over their children. In this age and
country, such provisions would be atrocious. If a father confined or
imprisoned his child for one year, the majesty of the law would frown
upon the unnatural act, and every tender mother and kind father would
rise up in arms against such monstrous inhumanity. Can the State, as
parenspatriae,exceed the power of the natural parent, except in punishing crime? 9
Noting that the confinement in reform school could be from one to
fifteen years depending on the age of the child at the time of commitment, the court concluded that executive clemency could not secure the
release of a child who had committed no offense and that habeas corpus
would not be available:
[T]he State, as parens patriae,has determined the imprisonment beyond recall. Such a restraint upon natural liberty is tyranny and oppression. If, without crime, without the conviction of any offense, the
children of the State are to be thus confined for the "good of society,"
then society had better be reduced to its original elements, and free
government acknowledged a failure.
• . .Why should children, only guilty of misfortune, be deprived
of liberty without "due process of law?"' 0
The Supreme Court of Illinois was the only court of that period to
declare a neglect statute unconstitutional, and its decision involving
Daniel O'Connell was regarded as socially irresponsible by the reformers
who believed so strongly in institutional care for crime prevention. The
State Reform School Act was revised in 1873 to correct the constitutional deficiencies; commitments were limited to criminal offenders, the
right to commit during minority was eliminated, and commitments for
parental neglect were abolished. 9' While subsequent decisions of the Illinois court have tended to distinguish the case on superficial grounds, the
primary significance of the case is its standard for determining when
parental conduct justifies state intervention and removal of the child's
"Id.
at 283-85 (footnotes omitted).
"Id. at 286-87.
9PLAr 104-05.
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custody-"gross misconduct or almost total unfitness on the part of the

parent.

. .

clearly proved.

'9 2

Since neglected children could no longer be committed to reform
schools, institutions under a new name-industrial schools-were created to care for such children. The industrial school movement began
in Illinois around 1875.13 These schools were intended for children who
were legally classified as "dependent," with the statutory definitions of
this term approximating the idea of a neglected child." Although they
were usually organized by private sectarian groups, they received public
funds. The county of residence was required to pay ten dollars per month
for the support of each child committed to industrial school from the

county.
Between 1882 and 1917, the Supreme Court of Illinois had at least
nine occasions to review the constitutionality of the industrial school

acts.95 The first case involved the commitment of a nine-year-old girl,
incorrigible and truant, who lacked parental care and wandered the

streets at night. In finding the legislation constitutional, the court distinguished the industrial school laws from the earlier statutes that had

established the Chicago Reform School in which commitment was regarded as imprisonment in violation of constitutional rights. In its decision the court relied on parenspatriae as the legal justification for the

state to interfere to protect children whose parents were unfit or had
failed.98 In a second case decided in the same year, the legislation was
again attacked because it permitted the organization of industrial
schools for sectarian purposes.17 Mary Stoner, age seven, was committed
9255 Ill.
at 284-85. See, e.g., Milwaukee Indus. School v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County,
40 Wis. 328, 338 (1876). In upholding the constitutionality of the Wisconsin statute, the court
adopted the standard of the "total failure of the parent to provide for the child."
"See P.ATrr 110-17.
"The industrial school legislation adopted in Illinois in 1879 defines a dependent girl as follows:
Every female infant who begs or receives alms while actually selling, or pretending to
sell any article in public; or who frequents any street, alley or other place, for the purpose
of begging or receiving alms; or, who having no permanent place of abode, proper
parental care, or guardianship, or sufficient means of subsistence, or who for other cause
is a wanderer through streets and alleys, and in other public places; or, who lives with,
or frequents the company of, or consorts with reputed thieves, or other vicious persons;
or who is found in a house of ill-fame, or in a poor house.
Act of May 28, 1879, § 3, [1879] I11.
Laws 309, quoted in In re Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367, 369-70 (1882).
"PLATr 114.
"In re Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367 (1882).
"County of McLean v. Humphreys, 104 Ill.
378 (1882).
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as a dependent child to age eighteen unless earlier discharged within the
discretion of the institution. One Laura Humphrey made arrangements
for the placement, apparently paying some of the expenses that were the
obligation of the county of residence. Mrs. Humphrey recovered her
thirty-four dollars; the law was again found constitutional; and parens
patriaewas cited as the legal cornerstone. 8 The sectarian issue came to
a head in 1888 when the Cook County Board of Commissioners refused
to pay twenty thousand dollars for the care and clothing of seventy-three
dependent girls from Cook County who had been committed to the
Chicago Industrial School for Girls by the county court. 9 The school
was proved to be merely a paper organization for two Roman Catholic
institutions that were actually caring for the children committed to the
Chicago Industrial School for Girls. Since the Illinois Constitution prohibited payment of public funds to sectarian institutions, the court ruled
for the county. Apparently, however, Cook County later decided to
contract with and pay such sectarian institutions for the care of dependent children.
Thus, even before the creation of the juvenile court, the development
of public responsibility for the care and protection of neglected children
was delayed by the vested interests of sectarian groups that had established child-caring institutions and were receiving public funds for the
support of the dependent children in their care. Relying on parens patriae, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed its 1870 position in the case
of Daniel O'Connell"' and endorsed the pactice of committing neglected
children to such sectarian institutions without following traditional concepts of due process of law. The juvenile court was born in an urban
community in which the child-saving organizations seemed to agree that
there should be no real distinctions between neglected children-then
legally classified as "dependent"-and child offenders if society was to
achieve a realistic approach to crime prevention. 01
"It is the unquestioned right and imperative duty of every enlightened government,

in its character ofparenspatriae,to protect and provide for the comfort and well-being
of such of its citizens as, by reason of infancy, defective understanding, or other misfortune or infirmity, are unable to take care of themselves. The performance of this duty is
justly regarded as one of the most important of governmental functions, and all constitutional limitations must be so understood and construed as not to interfere with its proper
and legitimate exercise.
Id. at 383.
"County of Cook v. Chicago Indus. School for Girls, 125 III. 540, 18 N.E. 183 (1888). See
PtAir 115.
1
®People ex rel. O'Connell v. Turner, 55 II1. 280 (1870).
101
PLATr 116-17.
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THE REFORM OF THE JUVENILE COURT: RHETORIC OR REALITY

The landmark developments in child welfare during the nineteenth
century were the establishment in 1825 of the New York House of
Refuge, "the first great event in child welfare,"'' I 2 and the creation of
the first juvenile court for Chicago by the Illinois legislature in 1899.103
The juvenile court was lauded as "the greatest advance in judicial history
since the Magna Charta."'' 14 Another writer described it as "'one of the
greatest advances in child welfare that has ever occurred.' "15
Recently, however, a new view of the history and performance of
the juvenile court has raised questions concerning the validity of these
earlier assertions.' The major reform achieved by the creation of the
juvenile court was the removal of child offenders from the criminal
courts-"the invention of delinquency."' 1 7 However, in regard to the
problem of protecting neglected or dependent children, the new separate
court for children seems to have done little more than confirm and
extend the nineteenth-century philosophy of preventive penology that
had been initiated seventy-five years beforp in the house-of-refuge movement. The juvenile court incorporated and continued the parenspatriae
philosophy that justified state intervention in family government under
new informal procedures that had been established for it. Like the industrial schools that preceded it, the juvenile court possessed broadly
defined jurisdiction over neglected children, with little thought having
been given to the rights of parents and children.
'ID. SCHNEIDER, THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC WELFARE IN NEW YORK STATE 1609-1866, at 317
(1938), quoted in Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An HistoricalPerspective,22 STAN. L. REV. 1187

(1970).
I'nAct of April 21, 1899, [1899] I11.
Laws 131.
'"This quote, which is attributed to Roscoe Pound, appears in Chute, The Juvenile Court in
Retrospect, 13 FED. PROBATION 3 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Chute]. Dean Pound also wrote in
1937: "The powers of the Star Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those of our. . . juvenile
courts... ." Forewordto YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY at xxvii
(1937), quoted in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967).
'See Chute 7.
1"'See PLATT 101-36; Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An HistoricalPerspective, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 1187 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Fox]. This new and well-documented research concerning
the history of the juvenile court brings into question the research and findings, heretofore accepted
as gospel, of pioneer writers on the juvenile court movement. For some examples of pioneer writers

whose enthusiasm for the juvenile court movement affected the objectivity of their findings see H.
Lou, JUVENILE COURTS INTHE UNITED STATES 2-23 (1927) [hereinafter cited as Lou]; Chute.

"'This is the basic thesis of Platt's book; hence the title, The Child Savers/ The Invention of
Delinquency. See note 86 supra.
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The juvenile court was also that product of political compromise
between private sectarian interests that operated the industrial schools
and state welfare authorities who believed strongly in state-operated
institutions for dependent and neglected children. The 1899 juvenile
court law continued the blurring of distinctions between neglected, dependent, and delinquent children and the practice of mixing these children in the same institutions-sometimes under repressive and punitive
conditions.' 0
The momentum for the juvenile court came from civic, social, and
professional leaders in Chicago. They were primarily women who were
concerned over the punitive applications of the criminal law to child
offenders and the large number of children who were then confined in
local jails and county poorhouses. As early as 1895 the Chicago
Woman's Club drafted legislation for a separate children's court, including a probation department, but abandoned its efforts when told
that the bill was unconstitutional. In 1898 a committee of social leaders
and lawyers was formed to draft a bill and work for its enactment.'"0
The bill, entitled "An act to regulate the treatment and control of dependent, neglected and delinquent children," was enacted by the Illinois
legislature near the end of its 1899 session." 0
The Philosophy Represented in the Juvenile Court Law

The nineteenth-century philosophy of preventive penology, initiated
around 1825 with the house-of-refuge movement, can be summarized as
follows: society should identify the conditions of childhood which lead
to crime, including poverty (thought to be caused primarily by immorality or indolence), parental neglect, idleness, ignorance, and others; legislation should be enacted to authorize commitment of children found in
these conditions to such institutions as houses of refuge or industrial
schools where techniques and resources were available for effective crime
prevention, particularly institutions in which children could learn to
work and receive moral training."' The terms "dependent" and "neglected" were used interchangeably in the 1899 juvenile court law, and
"'SLou 172 notes: "In a majority of states there is a failure to provide adequately for the
separate care of delinquent and dependent or neglected children, and dependent and neglected

children are often committed to institutions intended primarily for the care of delinquents."
'"'Chute 4.
reAct of April21, 1899, [1899] Ill. Laws 131.
"'See Fox 1232-33.
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these terms were defined in words that described conditions which were
believed to lead to crime in the early nineteenth century.' 12 The name of

the court was new, but the simplistic philosophy linking poverty, neglect,
and crime had remained unchanged. Moreover, it has continued as a

major theme of juvenile corrections into the twentieth century.
PoliticalPower of PrivateSectarianInterests

Before the juvenile court was established, the dependent or neglected
children who had been committed to industrial schools were cared for
by private sectarian (either Protestant or Catholic) agencies that received

public subsidies. In Illinois many children also lived in poorhouses,
which were public agencies. Religious preferences were generally ob-

served in commitments to industrial schools and child-placement agencies. The sectarian interests were opposed to commitment of children
3
across religious lines.1

The welfare authorities objected to caring for children in industrial
schools under private sponsorship. They felt that institutional care for
such children should be provided by the state and be under state control.
The private sectarian groups, however, had vested interests, since their

established institutions received public subsidies for children in care. In
deference to these sectarian interests, the new law authorized commit-

ment of dependent and neglected children to industrial schools and required that placements with individuals or institutions be in accordance
with the parents' religious preferences."' Further, the sectarian interests,

perhaps out of concern for their own financial interests, may also have
"'rhe Illinois Juvenile Court Act defined "dependent child and neglected child" as any child
under age 16
who for any reason is destitute or homeless or abandoned; or dependent upon the public
for support; or has not proper parental care or guardianship; or who habitually begs or
receives alms; or who is found living in any house of ill fame or with any vicious or
disreputable person; or whose home, by reason of neglect, cruelty or depravity on the
part of its parents, guardian or other person in whose care it may be, is an unfit place
for such a child; and any child under the age of 8 years who is found peddling or selling
any article or singing or playing any musical instrument upon the streets or giving any
public entertainment.
Act of April 21, 1899, § 1, [1899] Ill. Laws 131. Compare this statute with the 1882 Massachusetts
statute authorizing commitment of neglected children to overseers of the poor, note 82 supra, or
with the Illinois industrial school legislation, note 94 supra.
"'PLxrr 108-17, 134; Fox 1228-29.
"'Act of April 21, 1899, §§ 7, 17, [1899] Ill. Laws 133.
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opposed a proviso in the juvenile court law that would have required the
removal of children from poorhouses. This requirement was deleted
from the law, partly because it would involve additional public funds to
establish separate public institutions for children.'
Parens Patriae
The Illinois statute incorporated the concept of parenspatriae by
providing that "the care, custody and discipline of a child shall approximate as nearly as may be that which should be given by its parents
... -116 Itencouraged family placements that would result in adoption, and it gave the individuals or agencies to whom a child was committed broad authority over the child as guardian of the "ward." Such
individuals or agencies were given certain parental rights, including the
right to place the child in a family home (with or without apprenticeship)
and to consent to the child's adoption without notice to or consent from
the child's parents. 17 Thus, the general thrust of the law was to displace
certain broadly defined types of parents who were viewed as failures and
to substitute the state as parenspatriae.
This broad legal approach becomes disturbing when one recognizes
that the standards for parental care advocated by the "child savers"
were high; they reflected middle-class values. Yet, these standards tended
to be applied primarily to poor and immigrant families. The proponents
of the juvenile court movement were primarily middle-class women who
had access to money and political power and who believed that they were
rescuing those less fortunate in the social order. Some were pioneer
social workers of national stature-Jane Addams, Edith Abbott, and
Sophonisba Breckenridge:
The child savers set such high standards of family propriety that almost
any parent could be accused of not fulfilling his "proper function." In
effect, only lower-class families were evaluated as to their competence,
whereas the propriety of middle-class families was exempt from investigation and recrimination. 118
Nevertheless, juvenile court laws in Illinois and those that followed
in other states were generally upheld as constitutional. Frequently, the
n15d. § 18, at 137; Fox 1224-28.
"'Act ofApril 21, 1899, § 21, [1899] Ill. Laws 137.
117 d. at 133.
'PLATr
135.
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courts relied upon the concept of parens patriae to justify informal
procedures that were contrary to traditional notions of due process of
law and the rights of parents."' This doctrine was expanded in the twen20
tieth century to include juvenile delinquency.1
Juvenile Court Expansion and Performance
The Chicago juvenile court became the model for juvenile court
legislation that was rapidly adopted throughout the United States. By
1909 twenty states and the District of Columbia had enacted such laws,
and their constitutionality was well established. By 1920 all but three
states had a juvenile court system. Today, some 2,700 juvenile courts
hear children's cases throughout the United States. However, these state
laws vary in how or whether they define neglect and other parental
2
behavior that would justify court intervention.1 '
The law of neglect changed somewhat with the development of the
juvenile court. Juvenile court statutes stressed issues of parental fault,
parental actions or omissions, moral environment, adequacy of physical
care, and a proper home. 22 In interpreting these statutes, the courts
sometimes looked beyond the broad statutory language to incorporate
the standard used in civil custody disputes-the "best interests of the
child."1'1
Because of the expansion of juvenile probation services under the
juvenile court movement, the need to remove children from their homes
by institutional commitments for protective reasons has declined. The
availability of juvenile probation services has provided a new resource
for supervising children in their homes.2 4 This function more recently
has been assumed by public child welfare agencies in some states.
"'Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905). The leading cases upholding the
constitutionality ofjuvenile court acts in various states are collected in Lou 10 n.1.
"aSee Rosenheim, Perennial Problems in the Juvenile Court, in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD: THE
JUVENILE COURT INTRANSITION 8 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962).
21
' Lou 23-25; THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT

AND ADMINISTRATION OF

JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 2-4 (1967); Chute 4-5.

m"See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 600 (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 7024, 702-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 232.15 (3)(a),(b) (1969); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13:1570 (1968); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.03 (Page Supp. 1970); ORE. REV. STAT.

§ 419.476 (1969).
" See Note, Child Neglect: Due Processfor the Parent, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 465, 469 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Child Neglect].

ld.at 468.
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Most neglect petitions are initiated by institutional petitioners-welfare agencies, probation officers, and schools. The number of
neglect and dependency cases in the United States has increased in proportion to the population growth, reaching a high of 161,000 in 1966;
however, the incidence of these cases-2.2 per every one thousand children in the population under age eighteen-has remained approximately
the same. Most of the children involved are young-ninety percent less
than twelve, more than fifty percent less than six. Their families are
usually poor, uneducated, from minority groups, and often are public
assistance recipients. 2
Child-neglect cases have been regarded as civil, so that the right to
counsel has not been extended to parents or children under court interpretations of the United States Constitution. It seems clear that children
of poor, ignorant, and powerless parents are often adjudicated neglected
and sometimes removed from their parents partly because counsel is not
available. In recent years some of these neglect statutes have been attacked as unconstitutional because of vagueness or broad wording; generally, the attacks have failed.' 26
THE MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY: ANOTHER PERIOD OF RECOGNITION

The history of child protection in the United States indicates that
public interest in children is cyclical, recurring between periods of relative indifference. The decade of the 1960's was the first time in a century
that wide public interest was attracted by the complex and emotional
problems related to protecting children from physical maltreatment by
their own parents. The problem had been repressed from public consciousness.
The case of Mary Ellen in 1874 sparked "cruelty" societies under
private sponsorship. Juvenile delinquency and institutional reform were
the primary concerns during the juvenile court movement of the early
twentieth century. During this period only incidental concern was given
to child neglect, and then only in an attempt to protect children from
poverty and the evils of an industrialized society and, perhaps, to encourage middle-class values. The basic motivation of the juvenile court movement was society's interest in crime prevention under the nineteenthcentury philosophy of preventive penology.
nld. at 465-67.
1id. at 469-70 &n.30 (listing recent cases).
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The present interest, however, was not touched off by a sensational
case. Recognition of the problem was forced by objective new information that documented child abuse. This new information was largely
provided by technology (the X-ray machine) under medical leadership
(particularly pediatric radiology). Old phrases were revived-child abuse
and neglect-and new ones were coined to attract public attention-"the
battered-child syndrome." After the problem was identified and described by the medical community, sensational cases were discovered in
7
communities throughout the country and brought to public attention.'1
The reaction was emotional, angry, and quick. Some people attempted
to revive the earlier law-enforcement approach of the New York SPCC,
which advocated swift justice and sure punishment for the abusive parents. Others advocated a more thoughtful and studied approach. The
resulting compromise was the enactment of child-abuse reporting laws
that generally supported the contemporary idea that protective services
to parents could usually provide child protection without the necessity
of removing the child from his own home. The fact that reporting laws
have been passed has served to assure the public-perhaps unrealistically-that children are being protected and that parents are being
helped.
One important principle seems to be agreed upon. The study, understanding, and. development of programs to deal effectively with child
abuse and neglect are beyond the professional competence of any one
of the related professional disciplines--law, medicine, social work, psychiatry, psychology, and others-and beyond the capacity of any single
community resource-law enforcement, welfare programs, courts, hospitals, private family agencies, and so forth. Thus, effective programs
will require interdisciplinary efforts and coordination of community resources. Such cooperation and coordination have always been difficult
to achieve.
r'The case of Roxanne Felumero, age three, whose body was found in the East River in New
York City on March 25, 1969, is a good example. The press reported that she had been the subject
of a petition in the New York Family Court for alleged parental neglect or abuse two months before
her death. After the hearing, the judge had released the child in her parent's custody. When
recovered from the river, the child's body was bruised and battered and her pockets were weighted
with rocks. The resulting public furor led to a judicial investigation of alleged mishandling of the

proceedings by two family court judges. The investigating committee concluded that if the family
court and the complex of public and provate agencies had functioned more efficiently, Roxanne
would not have died. See BAKAN, supra note 1, at 45-47; Burt, ForcingProtection on Children and
Their Parents: The Impact of Wyman v. James, 69 MIcH. L. Rav. 1259, 1274-75 (1971); Felder,
supra note 73, at 184.
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But disagreement exists on many other important aspects of abuse
and neglect-including the extent of the problem, its causes, and effective strategies for preventing abuse and protecting children. There is also
confusion over the goals-whether society should seek to punish the
parents or protect the children or both. Few seem to admit that the state
of the art and knowledge in the field is in its infancy.
Beginnings of Recognition
In 1946 a pediatric radiologist first called attention to the common
association of subdural hematomas (blood clots around the brain resulting from blows to the head) and abnormal fractures of the long bones
in infants. 12 Parental explanations of these injuries seemed unrealistic,
contradictory, and inconsistent with medical findings, but medical researchers were reluctant to say that these injuries were the result of
trauma due to parental maltreatment. Not until the mid-1950's did
medical researchers and authors acknowledge in medical journals that
these injuries were intentionally inflicted by abusive parents and other
caretakers. 2 1Several prominent medical leaders sponsored a symposium
on child abuse in 196 1,"30 later publishing their findings and popularizing
the phrase that they had coined to attract public interest-the "battered
child syndrome." 13' The problem attracted widespread interest in the
medical profession, and this recognition led to broader public awareness.
Other professionals became aware and involved, and many articles appeared in the various professional journals (social work, medicine, psychiatry, and law), sometimes with contradictory findings concerning the
nature and causes of the problem, the number of children involved, and
appropriate solutions.
Recognizing the need for interdisciplinary cooperation, the Children's Bureau of HEW in 1962 called a conference of the appropriate
12Caffey, Multiple Fracturesin the Long Bones of Infants Suffering from Chronic Subdural
Hematoma, 56 Am.J. ROENTGENOLOGY 163 (1946).
"'Fisher, Skeletal Manifestations of Parent-InducedTrauma in Infants and Children, 51 S.
MED. J. 956-60 (1958); Silver & Kempe, The Problem of Parental Criminal Neglect and Severe
Physical Abuse of Children, 98 AM. J. DISEASES OF CHILDREN 528 (1950); Woolley & Evans,
Significance of Skeletal Lesions in Infants Resembling Those of Traumatic Origin, 158 J.A.M.A.

539-43 (1955).
110See Radbill, supra note 5, at 16.
"'Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller, & Silver, The Battered Child Syndrome, 181
J.A.M.A. 17,42 (1962).
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professional groups to promote better understanding of the problem.132
The principal recommendation of this group was that a model childabuse reporting law be drafted for use by the states.
Reporting-Law Movement
Five different models for child-abuse reporting laws were proposed
by various sponsors between 1963 and 1966. The most significant was
the first, which was proposed by the Children's Bureau in 1963 as a
result of its conference held the year before.133 This was a mandatory
reporting law that required physicians to report cases to police authorities when they had reasonable cause to suspect that a child within the
age of juvenile court jurisdiction had suffered serious physical injury by
other than accidental means from a parent or other caretaker. Physicians who reported in good faith were given immunity from civil or
criminal liability. Any physician who failed to report was punishable
under the criminal law for a misdemeanor. The model waived two of the
traditional privileges under the law of evidence: the physician-patient
privilege and the husband-wife privilege. The physician-patient privilege
was waived to permit doctors to report and testify in court without
incurring liability for violating the confidentiality of physician-patient
communications. The husband-wife privilege was waived so that one
parent could testify to the abuse by the other in court proceedings. This
waiver was believed necessary because child abuse most often occurs in
the privacy of the home.
The Children's Division of the American Humane Association issued similar guidelines for mandatory reporting in 196 3 .I3 These two
models had the same underlying philosophical purpose--to help parents rather than to punish. The major differences was that the AHA
proposed the reporting of child abuse or neglect to public or private child
welfare community agencies. The Children's Bureau Model proposed
reporting to the police because they are usually available twenty-four
hours per day. The Children's Bureau later modified its model to suggest
that child welfare agencies receive reports when they had adequate proMoD.Gil,

VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN: PHYSICAL CHILD ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES

(1970) [hereinafter cited as VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN].
...CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEW, THE ABUSED

21

CHILD-PRINCIPLES AND SUGGESTED LANGUAGE FOR LEGISLATION ON REPORTING OF THE PHYSICALLY ABUSED CHILD (1963).
'3'CHILDREN'S DIVISION, AM. HUMANE ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGISLATION TO PROTECT THE

BATTERED CHILD

(1963).
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tective services; otherwise, reports should continue to go to the police ' 35
The American Medical Association objected to mandatory reporting under penalty of criminal law applicable only to physicians. 36 They
were concerned that abusive parents would be deterred from seeking
medical care if doctors were required to report. Thus, the AMA proposed its own model-a voluntary reporting law under which a variety
of types of professionals (physicians, nurses, teachers, social workers)
were authorized to report to either the police or a child welfare agency. 3 1
The Council of State Government published its model in 1965. This
model statute represented a compromise between the models of the Children's Bureau and the AHA. 131 Finally, the Committee on the Infant and
Preschool Child of the American Academy of Pediatrics published its
approach as legislative guidelines in 1966.13 It favored mandatory reporting by physicians to a social service agency. This model also proposed the establishment of a central registry at the state level to accumulate data concerning the extent of child abuse and also to keep track of
abused children if parents moved from one place to another.
With speed uncharacteristic of state legislatures, all fifty states
adopted some form of child-abuse reporting statute within a four-year
period from 1963 to 1967.110 The mandatory reporting-law approach
initially proposed by the Children's Bureau was adopted in forty-four
states, and voluntary reporting laws were passed in the remaining six
states. A 1970 survey of abuse legislation reported that only four states
still had voluntary reporting laws; at least one of these has since enacted
141
mandatory provisions.
m'Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of the Legislation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
17 (1967).
luBattered Child Legislation, 188 J.A.M.A. 386 (1964).
'MAMA, Physical Abuse of Children-Suggested Legislation (1965).
" COMM. OF STATE OFFICIALS ON SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, COUNCIL OF STATE GovERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION

(1965).

' 'Comm. on Infant and Pre-School Child, Maltreatment of Children-The PhysicallyAbused

Child, 37 PEDIATRICS 377-82 (1966).
"'See V. DE FRANCIS, CHILD ABUSE LEGISLATION IN THE 1970s, at 5-6 (Am. Humane Ass'n
1970); VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 21-22.

"'See V. DE FRANCIS, supra note 140, at 5-6. North Carolina repealed the voluntary law it
had enacted in 1965 and substituted a mandatory law in 1971. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 110-115
to-122 (Supp. 1971); ch.472, § 1, [1965] N.C. Sess. L. 533. For an excellent review of the medical,
legal, and legislative concerns about child abuse up to 1965 see McCoid, The Battered Child And
Other Assaults Upon The Family:Part One, 50 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1965).
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Extent of Child Abuse
Accurate information on the extent of child abuse in the United
States is unavailable for many reasons.1 12 Abuse usually occurs in the
privacy of the home. Further, abusing parents may be isolated from
community life by poverty, geography, or social class. Often, the child
victims are too young to either complain or understand that their treatment is inappropriate. Moreover, it is comfortable to believe the parental explanation that the child's injuries were accidental. Even when abuse
is known or suspected, relatives and neighbors are afraid to intervene,
physicians and school officials are reluctant to report, and the courts
have difficulties in establishing abuse under traditional procedures. Finally, the legal definitions of reportable child abuse vary from state to
state.
The first studies appeared in the early 1960's after the phenomenon
of child abuse had been identified. These studies were often based on
crude survey methods and resulted in conflicting findings that were ambiguous and confusing.1 3 Some early reports tended to sensationalize the
as
problem. A 1962 editorial in a medical journal identified child abuse 144
a more frequent cause of death than traditional children's diseases.
During that same year a popular magazine implied an annual incidence
that approached thirty thousand cases.1 45 A study based on newspaper
reports of child abuse during 1962 identified 662 cases that involved 557
families, with eighty percent of the abused children less than four years
of age and more than half less than two; most of the injuries resulted
from beatings with various types of instruments (television antennas,
rubber hoses, baseball bats, and chair legs); children were burned with
lighted cigarettes, electric irons, .and hot pokers; some were strangled
with pillows or plastic bags or drowned in bathtubs; others were stabbed,
1

2rrhe best overview of various studies on the extent of child abuse is contained in VIOLENCE
AGAINST CHILDREN 18-148. The reader may also want to see V. FONTANA, THE MALTREATED
CHILD: THE MALTREATMENT SYNDROME IN CHILDREN 6-9 (2d ed. 1971); Gil, Incidence of Child
Abuse and DemographicCharacteristicsof PersonsInvolved, in THE BATTERED CHILD 19 (1968).
laThere were also local studies during the early 1960's conducted by hospitals and social
agencies. See L. YOUNG, WEDNESDAY'S CHILDREN, A STUDY OF CHILD NEGLECT AND ABUSE
(1964); Bordman, A Projectto Rescue Children From Inflicted Injuries, 7 SOCIAL WORK 43 (1962);
Elmer, Abused Young Children Seen in Hospitals, 5 SOCIAL WORK 98 (1960); Merrill, Physical
Abuse of Children-An Agency Study in Protecting the Battered Child, in PROTECTING THE BATTERED CHILD

(Am. Humane Ass'n 1962).

'"Editorial, 181 J.A.M.A. 42 (1962).
"'SATURDAY EVENING POST, Oct. 6, 1962, at 32.
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bitten, shot, or thrown against a wall or floor."' A national news program in 1971 reported that child abuse causes more deaths than the three
leading children's diseases.1 47 A recent news article estimated that
500,000 children in the United States are abused each year-physically,
48
sexually, or emotionally.
A 1965 study revealed that three percent of the 1,520 persons who
had been surveyed had personal knowledge of an incident of child abuse
that resulted in physical injury within a one-year period.14 1 By applying
this three percent figure to adult population statistics of the United
States, the study suggested that 2.53 to 4.07 million adults had personal
knowledge of child abuse in 1965. In spite of legitimate questions concerning these statistical methods, this study is often cited to document
the existence of two to four million child-abuse cases annually in the
United States. The same researcher subsequently conducted a survey to
collect data on child-abuse cases that had been reported to central registries in the states and territories during 1967 and 1968.1'1 This data
showed 9,563 cases in 1967 and 10,931 in 1968. When these data were
screened to eliminate cases that did not involve physical abuse, the numbers were reduced by more than one third. Thus, the number of physically abused children was reduced to 5,993 for 1967 and 6,617 for 1968.
This information is admittedly incomplete, for not all cases are identified or reported to central registries. The reported cases may include the
more sensational "tip of the iceberg." Nevertheless, the general trend
in terms of the number of cases reported has been upward.
Causes of Child Abuse

During the last ten years, many professionals have offered explanations of the etiology of child abuse. What causes parents to abuse their
own children? What are the characteristics of abusing parents? Can
abusing parents be effectively treated? Can their methods of handling
children be altered? The answers to these questions have been conflicting
and confusing. They have tended to vary somewhat with the professional
discipline of the researcher-medicine, psychiatry, psychology, or social
"IV. DE FRANCIS, CHILD ABUSE-PREvIEw OF A NATIONWIDE SURVEY (Am. Humane Ass'n

1963).
"1CBS Evening News, Mar. 25, 1971.
'N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1971, at 16, cols. 1-6.
'See VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 58-60.
1
'Id. at 92-102.
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work-and sharp disagreements have occurred within some single disciplines, such as psychiatry.
Some of the studies during the early 1960's were based on small
samples that has been selected from children's clinics, hospitals, protective service agencies, psychiatric clinics, and newspaper reports of child
abuse. Early medical and social-work studies found that abusing parents
often suffered from personality disorders, that often one of several children in a family was selected to be abused, and that the median age of
the child victims was seven. 15 ' A 1962 survey by the AHA of newspaper
stories of child abuse found that the most serious injuries were inflicted
by fathers and were primarily related to efforts to discipline. On the
other hand, maternal child abuse seemed to be more related to serious
emotional problems. Nevertheless, the study viewed all abusing parents
as emotionally immature.5 2 During this period medical and social work
abusresearchers also identified the repeating cycle of child abuse; many
3
ing parents had been abused in childhood by their own parents."
The most confusing and conflicting explanations have come from
the field of psychiatry."5 Some researchers have identified the phenomenon of "role reversal" in abusing parents.5 In its simplest form this
psychiatric explanation suggests that the abusing parent distorts reality,
becomes a child, perceives his child as an adult or as his own parent who
has hurt or failed him, and physically abuses his child when the child
fails to meet his own emotional needs. Another psychiatric explanation
holds that child abuse results from a parent's inability to handle his own
internal conflicts or need for punishment; when he physically mistreats
the child, he is symbolically abusing himself."' Yet another psychiatrist
has noted that the personality disorders identified as causing child abuse
are also found in parents who do not abuse their children. Consequently,
he concludes that these factors are not a sufficient explanation by them"'L. YOUNG, supra note 143; Kempe, supra note 131, at 18; McHenry, Girdany, & Elmer,
Unsuspected Traumawith Multiple Skeletal Injuries during Infancy and Childhood,31 PEDIATRICS
903-08 (1963); Merrill, supra note 143.
'See V. DE FRANCIS, supra note 146.
lu3See VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 27; Kempe, supra note 131, at 18; McHenry, supra note
151, at 903-08.

'lThe psychiatric explanations discussed in the text accompanying notes 152-56 were presented
at a workshop in 1966 at the University of Colorado by Brandt F. Steele and C. Henry Kempe.

They were reported in VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 25-35.
"'See, e.g., VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 31.
1'1Id. at 27-29.
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selves. However, he did find that the common denominator among abusing parents was characterized by demands for unrealistic performance
from young children to satisfy parental needs. 5 7 Thus, the abusing parent perceives the child not as an infant but as an adult capable of meeting
the parent's need to be mothered, cared for, and listened to. Another
psychiatrist has suggested that the present level of psychiatric understanding of the etiology of child abuse is so limited that it cannot be
5
considered as established knowledge. 1
Psychiatrists also have different views of the prognosis for effective
intervention and treatment. Some give encouraging reports; however,
others seem to feel that psychiatry has little to offer in the treatment of
abusing parents.'
With the increasing availability of data from state registries, it has
been possible to develop national surveys and epidemiologic studies of
child abuse that give a somewhat different picture. The most thorough
national epidemiologic survey, completed in 1968, provided the following findings: The primary incidence of child abuse is in poor families;
recidivism is high in abusing families, with patterns of abuse being transmitted from one generation to the next; child abuse is most prevalent in
large families and matriarchal households; more older children (as distinguished from infants) are victims than had previously been suggested;
the abused child's behavior can be provocative and a substantial factor
in abuse; and both abusing parents and their child victims have troubled
personal histories.16
These researchers concluded that child abuse cannot be explained
by one set of causal factors. Instead, it should be viewed as resulting
from multiple causes that operate singly or in various combinations.,"'
The basic dimension that was identified (over which other causes were
superimposed) was the cultural attitude toward the use of physical force
in parent-child discipline and the absence of societal sanctions against
117d. at 30-3 1.
11id. at 29.
42-43 &n.43.
"rhis series of studies was conducted under a grant from the Children's Bureau of HEW to
the Child Welfare Research Program of Brandeis University. The most significant portions of the
series were a nationwide survey of public knowledge, attitudes, and opinions about physical abuse
and a survey of every incident of physical abuse reported through legal channels in 1967 and 1968.
For a report of the findings see VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 130.
11Id. at 133-37.
"'VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN
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this form of interpersonal violence. 1

2

Closely related were the child-

rearing practices of various social classes and ethnic and cultural groups
whose traditions included greater use of physical force in achieving child-

rearing goals. In addition, there were other related dimensions: chance
factors that transformed an acceptable disciplinary incident into an act

of child abuse; stress that reduced a parent's control and led to violent
reactions or overreactions.
Many advocates of protective services to abusive parents seem to

adopt a simplistic concept of causation that is based on the medical
model of diagnosis and treatment.'6 They view abusive parents as sick

people who need treatment, and they believe that a range of professionals
(psychiatrists, psychologists, but primarily social workers) have the re-

quisite knowledge and skills to treat and cure the sickness. They support
the idea of protective services, because under this approach the child can

be left in his own home while efforts are being made to correct the causes

of parental abuse.'64 Other professionals question the validity of these
assumptions and point to the absence of a single set of accepted causal

factors, the cultural acceptance of violence in child discipline, and the
2

" The basic thesis of Gil's scholarly and well-documented research-that American disciplinary practices may tend to rear children who are committed to violence as an acceptable pattern
of behavior-is both disturbing and provocative. Id. at 133-48. Gil feels that since the culturally
determined permissive attitudes of using violence in the rearing of children is probably the "common core" of all physical abuse in America, systematic efforts should be made to change this
element in parent-child interaction. Also, clear-cut legal sanctions and other prohibitions should
be established against the use of violence and force in rearing children.
Violence against children in rearing them may thus be a functional aspect of socialization
into a highly competitive and often violent society, one that puts a premium on the
uninhibited pursuit of self-interest and that does not put into practice the philosophy of
human cooperativeness which it preaches on ceremonial occasions and which is upheld
in its ideological expressions and symbols.
Id. at 142. Yet, however well taken this point may be, it seems myopic to present these child-raising
practices as uniquely American; the patterns found in American families will have counterparts all
around the world.
Gil also found that poverty is very deeply intertwined with the phenomenon of child abuse and
that its unconditional elimination is another important element in the route to preventing child
abuse. Some of the more important aspects of eliminating poverty would be adequate income,
housing, and neighborhoods; comprehensive health care and social services; wide-ranging educational programs fitted to the needs of each student; and cultural-recreational facilities.
Gil would also add comprehensive family planning, family-life education, and counseling programs
for adolescents and adults "with the assumption that there is much to learn about married life and
parenthood which one does not know merely on the basis of sexual and chronological maturity."
Id. at 146.
"'E.g., Silver, Child Abuse Syndrome: A Review, 96 MED. TImEs 803-18 (1968).
'"E.g., Kadushin, supra note 5, at 202-56.
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personality deviations of abusing parents that seem unresponsive to
known treatment techniques.1 5
THE FRAMEWORK FOR CHILD PROTECTION: LEGAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES

The traditional policy of the law has been that the rearing of children is the responsibility of parents rather than of government. The
courts have generally protected the right of parents both to the custody
of their children and to discipline them without state interference. Emphasis has been greater on parental rights than on child protection and
the rights of children. 6 ' The right or duty of the state to intervene in
family government to protect children has emerged over the last 150
years. The house-of-refuge movement began with broad legislative classifications that authorized state interference under informal judicial procedures that were contrary to traditional notions of parental rights and
due process of law. This movement was supported by judicial precedents
that upheld the constitutionality of such legislation by reliance upon the
doctrine of parenspatriae,which also became the legal cornerstone for
the juvenile court. Legislatures and courts have gradually begun to think
more about children's rights as well as their need for protection.
The child-abuse reporting laws of the 1960's have broadened the
duty of the community to intervene in family life for protective purposes.
The reporting laws were added to an existing legal framework that already provided for state intervention to protect children in specified
circumstances. This legal framework included criminal statutes and case
precedents that limited excessive parental discipline; civil law precedents
that governed child custody disputes; various state juvenile court acts;
and state legislation that provided for protective services. The individual
parts of this framework have developed somewhat independently so that
legislatures, courts, and scholars have seldom examined the framework
as a whole in order to evaluate its effectiveness for child protection.6 7
The task of legislatures and courts during the 1970's will be to
SSee VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 42-43 & n.43.
'"One source for the development of the concept of rights of children was the organization of
"cruelty" societies to protect children during the nineteenth century. See address by Elbridge T.
Gerry, founder of the New York Society, published in the Proceedingsof the National Conference
of Charities and Corrections (1882), reprintedin 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 56, at 196-

97.
"'The broad legal framework for child protection is discussed in detail in Paulsen, The Legal
Frameworkfor Child Protection,66 COLUM. L. REv. 679 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Paulsen].
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examine the entire framework and to eliminate the conflicting rights and
policies. The rights of parents need re-evaluation in the context of contemporary notions of due process of law and the need of some children
for protection from their own parents. The traditional legal notion that
the state should not interfere in family government seems modified by
recent legislative policy that parental abuse and neglect should be identified and reported so that appropriate protection can be provided.
Right of Parentsto Discipline
The general thrust of both civil and criminal case precedents is to
provide parents with immunity against liability for money damages or
criminal prosecution for excessive child discipline. Despite the fact that
a child may sue his parents for breach of contract or for damage to his
property, most states cling to the old common law rule that an unemancipated child may not sue his parents in tort for personal injuries.' 8
While the courts give a number of policy reasons for this rule, the most
common is that allowing a child to sue will disrupt family harmony and
will interfere with parental rights to care, custody, control, and discipline. The child-parent civil immunity rule has been criticized recently
as outmoded.
The criminal cases tend to allow a parent to heed the Biblical warning that to spare the rod is to spoil the child. The parent's right to
discipline generally gives him leave to punish for disciplinary reasons
without fear of criminal liability.' However, the criminal cases are
divided on the limits of this privilege. The majority rule imposes criminal
liability on parents who use unreasonable or excessive force. A parent
may inflict punishment that is reasonable under the facts and circumstances; the question of reasonableness is an issue for jury determination.
Many states still follow the older minority rule under which the parent's
ciminal liability depends upon whether the parent's motives were malicious or whether he inflicted permanent injury to the child. Under this
view parental motives are decisive unless permanent injury is inflicted.
A parent would not be criminally liable for an error of judgment or
"'The cases are collected and summarized in H. CLARK,
§ 9.2 (1968). See also W. PROSSER,

THE LAW OF DOrdEsTIc RELATIONS
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 116 (3d ed. 1964); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. REv.

IN THE UNITED STATES

1030 (1930); Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423 (1951).
"'For a summary of the applicable cases and discussion of the majority and minority rules

see Paulsen 686-88.
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because the severity of the punishment was disproportionate to the
child's misconduct; he would be liable only if the punishment resulted
in permanent injury or was inflicted with malice rather than to correct
the child for his own benefit.
Parents'Right to Custody

Traditional notions of parental rights have changed somewhat in
the emerging judicial concern over the rights of children and child protection. Under the English common law, the father's right to the custody, labor, and services of his child was comparable to a property right;
it was superior to the mother's rights and in some instances was enforceable regardless of the child's welfare. This concept of parental custody
rights can be found in some early American cases, but it has generally
been changed by statutes and judicial interpretations that give both
parents similar rights to the custody and control of their children. Many
courts now prefer the mother as custodian in custody controversies between parents, particularly when the child is an infant or a girl.,
Two points of view on the question of custody rights can currently
be found in American decisions. The traditional view, still followed by
many states, holds that a parent is prima facie entitled to the custody
of his child unless shown to be unfit. Anyone who alleges that a parent
is unfit must establish the unsuitability of the parent. The remnants of
the old concept of a parent's property rights in his child are operative
under this rule. Under the more contemporary view, the prevailing criteria revolve around the "best interests of the child" or "welfare of the
child." Under this rule the court will award custody to the person or
agency that the court finds will best promote the child's welfare. While
most of the states follow this rule, it has been criticized for its elasticity
17
and ambiguity.
Some states have recently adopted statutes that authorize termina72
tion of parental rights when children are severely neglected or abused.
1"The cases and rules governing custody disputes are collected in Note, Custody of Minor
Children-Award to a Fit Parent May Be Reversed on Appeal, 7 J. FAt. L. 81 (1967). See also
CLARK,supranote 168, §§ 17.1-.7.
"'Note, J. FAM. L., supranote 170, at 86.
"'See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-288 (1969). For a discussion of these statutes in various
states see Note, Legislative and Judicial Recognition of the Distinction Between Custody and
Termination Orders in Child Neglect Cases, 7 J. FAm. L. 66 (1967). See also Hansen, Suggested
GuidelinesforChild Abuse Laws, 7 J. FAM. L. 61 (1967), where the writer suggests that since abused
children who live through two court hearings seldom survive for the third, it should be presumed

at the second hearing that the parents are unfit unless they prove otherwise.
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These statutes reflect a legislative policy to separate children from parents permanently in cases of gross neglect or physical abuse and to offer
them the possibility of establishing a new legal identity through adoption. The statutes also provide an opportunity for child-welfare agencies
to avoid having neglected children, who have been removed by court
order from the custody of their parents and placed in agency foster
homes, grow up in "legal limbo" 1 3 in foster homes at public expense.
Other CriminalLaws
No additional criminal statutes seem necessary in order to deal with
the phenomenon of child abuse. The criminal codes of most states now
contain ample laws for the prosecution of abusing parents-laws against
homicide and assault and battery, cruelty-to-children statutes, and the
"contributing" statutes that authorize the prosecution of parents and
others who contribute to the neglect of a child. These statutes raise
important legal and social issues that are too numerous and too complex
1 74
to discuss here.
The most important issue is the social efficacy of criminal law
sanctions in child-abuse cases. Prosecution of parents can result in fines,
imprisonment of parents, separation of parent and child, and damage
to the family's reputation. If there is hope for a continuing family life
that would benefit the children, prosecution is not the answer. Fines
reduce limited family financial abilities. Imprisonment separates parent
and child. Placement resources are not always available or better than
the child's own home; if they are available, they are costly in terms of
public funds and can result in emotional damage to the child. Because
of the social disadvantages of criminal prosecution, such an approach
may be appropriate only in cases of gross physical abuse that involves
permanent physical injury or death. One scholar sumniarized the problem as follows:
tu1his term refers to the legal status of a neglected child who is not legally free for adoption

but who has been removed from the custody of his parents by court order and placed in the custody
of a child-welfare agency for placement. This occurs when the family situation is so bad that it

appears doubtful that the child can ever return to his family. Such a child often grows up in foster
care without the roots and security of his own family. He is not legally free for adoption without
parental consent in the absence of statutory authority for termination of parental rights.
"'See Paulsen 680-93. These points are also summarized in Paulsen, The Law and Abused
Children, in THE BATrERD CHILD 175 (1968). See also S. Fox, THE LAW OF JUVENILE COURTS IN
A NUTSHELL §

15 (1971).
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Merely beginning a prosecution is likely to mean the end of the chance
to improve a child's home situation. Parents are nearly always resentful
of the proceeding, and the hostility thus engendered makes casework
with the child's family all but impossible. Moreover, a criminal prosecution is a clumsy affair. The defendant must be proved guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, and a criminal trial is subject to a great many rules
of evidence that are grounded in policies other than the pursuit of iruth
and the punishment of crime when crime is found. .

.

. An act of child

abuse is not likely to take place openly, and when it does, neighbors
are often unwilling to testify. And there are other facts to be faced. The
prosecutor's office must take time to investigate and to prepare its case.
Postponements at the request of the defense or prosecution, or for the
convenience of witnesses or the court, occur often as a matter of
course. '7-

The prosecutor is more accustomed to thinking in legal than in social
terms. One primary legal issue is whether there is enough evidence to
establish the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, a prosecutor who
thinks primarily in social terms about child protection or the importance
of keeping the family together may encounter political problems:
The public prosecutor exercises a very great discretion in the prosecution of criminal cases. Not all parents who have assaulted their child
will be tried on criminal charges. In any given case the prosecutor may
very well judge that the matter is best handled in a juvenile court or a
family court should there be one. Perhaps the biggest difficulty which
the prosecutor faces if he decides that the parents should be dealt with
by any agency other than the criminal court is the fact that the prosecutor is an elected official who may feel the need to respond to public
pressure in a highly publicized and sensational case.",8
Juvenile Court Acts
In most states the statutes that define the neglect jurisdiction of the
juvenile court include the abused or battered child. A juvenile hearing
that involves child neglect typically includes three determinations: (I) the
facts alleged to constitute neglect; (2) whether the established facts come
within the statutory definition of neglect; and (3) if neglect is established,
the disposition to be made. Generally, the tendency is to construe neglect
statutes to authorize court intervention when the evidence shows a need
'nt Paulsen 692.

"'Paulsen, The Law and Abused Children,in THE

BATTERED CHILD

176 (1968).
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for child protection. 177
Many disturbing social, legal, and constitutional issues arise in
child-neglect cases in juvenile courts. The most complex issue concerns
the standards of parental conduct that should be applied in determining
whether a child is neglected. The most important constitutional question
is whether there should be a lesser quality of due process of law in neglect
cases than in adjudications of delinquency.
The legal borders of neglect have received little attention in legal
writings. One prominent judge urged close attention to statutory definitions, a presumption in favor of the parents, and a standard adopted
from the law of negligence-whether the parent exercised reasonable
care under the circumstances. 17 He also discussed medical neglect (including cases in which medical care is denied for religious reasons),
emotional neglect, physical neglect, educational neglect, and moral neglect and concluded that the field demands both legal and social judgment. The standard of "reasonable care under the circumstances" was
later criticized by another scholar who argued that a neglectful parent
is one who falls below the minimum acceptable standard of parental
behavior: "In practice, the meaning of the neglect standard varies according to the problem, the relationship of the custodian to the child,
and the disposition that is sought in the case . . . . [T]he meaning of
'
'neglect' turns on the goal of the proceeding." 179
The struggle for an
appropriate standard against which to measure parental conduct is perhaps best summarized by the comments of the New York Joint Legislative Committee concerning the New York Family Court Act of 1962:
"All interested persons agreed that parents 'neglect' their children (in
a legal sense) when they fail adequately to supply them with food,
clothing, shelter, education, or medical or surgical care, 'though finanThe Committee found, howeVer, that intercially able to do so' ....
ested persons disagreed over the extent to which children whose parents
supply the physical needs of life may nevertheless be adjudicated as
'neglected children.' Some say when a child suffers from 'improper
supervision,' others, when he suffers from 'a parental pattern of not
satisfying his emotional needs'; still others, whenever there is a parental
pattern of not properly caring for the child. The Committee concluded
'"See Fox, supra note 174, § 14; Paulsen 693-703; ChildNeglect, supra note 123, at 472.
'Gil, The Legal Nature of Neglect, 6 NAT'L PROBATION & PAROLE ASS'N J. 1 (1960).
"'Paulsen, The delinquency, Neglect, & Dependency Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, in
JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD: THE JUVENILE COURT INTRANSITION 74 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962).
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that these differences reflect the diversity of practices and beliefs in our
society, and that this diversity was not a proper matter of governmental
regulation so long as basic standards were not violated. The Committee
also concluded that the Family Court's neglect jurisdiction should be
invoked only in situations of serious need."'' 8
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court require that
state juvenile courts protect certain constitutional rights of children alleged to be delinquent in the adjudicatory phase of a juvenile hearing in
order to assure due process of law. These procedural rights include
written notice of the charges before the juvenile hearing, the right to
counsel (including the right to assigned counsel at state expense for
indigents), the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses, and proof of delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt if the child is charged with an act that would constitute a
crime if committed by an adult.' While there is no right to jury trial, 82
the net effect of these procedural requirements is to provide a higher
quality of due process and fairness in an adjudication of delinquency that
justifies state intervention than is required in juvenile neglect hearings.
These constitutional rights have not yet been held generally applicable to neglect hearings, which, like hearings to adjudicate delinquency,
are labeled "civil." For example, neither the child nor the parentrespondent has a constitutional right to assigned counsel. Some of the
typical procedural practices in neglect cases would not be tolerated in
civil custody proceedings, criminal trials, or adjudication of juvenile
delinquency in the same juvenile court. Perhaps the most serious violation of rights occurs in the admissibility of hearsay evidence, particularly
written social, medical, or psychiatric reports in cases in which the writer
does not testify in court. The act of admitting this material constitutes
a denial of the right to contront and cross-examine a witness whose
written statements are accepted in evidence to establish parental neglect.as
'"Child Neglect 474 (emphasis omitted).
"'In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
"1McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
"'See Child Neglect 475-85. Important constitutional and other legal issues in these cases are
discussed in a number of sources including Burt, ForcingProtectionon Children and Their Parents:
The Impact of Wyman v. James, 69 Micn. L. REv. 1259 (1971); Representation in Child-Neglect
Cases: Are Parents Neglected, 4 COLUM. J. LAW & SOC. PROBLEMS 230 (1968); W. SHERIDAN,
STANDARDS FOR JUvENILE AND FAmILY COURTS (Children's Bureau Pub. No. 437-1966, 1966).

Sheridan states: "No judicial decision should be based upon an undisclosed fact." Id. at 74
(emphasis omitted).
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The possible consequences to children and parents in juvenile neglect cases are serious. If a child is adjudicated neglected, the court
usually may take one of the following courses of action: order supervision of the child in his own home; remove him from the custody of his
parents; place him with a public or private agency or in an institution;
order that the parents be prosecuted for criminal law violations that
emerge in the juvenile proceedings; and in some cases, order termination
of parental rights-an action which permanently severs the parent-child
relationship.
Parents and children perceive these proceedings as punitive. Even
though the proceedings are labeled "civil" or "juvenile," the parents
feel that they are on trial, especially since social agencies in the community often give evidence against them. 1" Therefore, the important legal
and social issues revolve about whether it is reasonable to provide a
lesser quality of due process in the fact-finding portion of neglect hearings in juvenile court than is required in adjudication of delinquency.
A related problem is the confused legal status of parenspatriae in
adjudication of neglect and delinquency in light of In re Gault 185 and
contemporary notions of due process of law. In Gault the Court seemed
more concerned with substance than labels; it stressed the importance
of procedure in assuring fairness and required certain procedures in an
adjudication of delinquency when a child might lose his freedom by
institutional commitment. The Court raised-but never answered-many questions about parenspatriae:
The Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who sought to
rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme;
but its meaning is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious
relevance. The phrase was taken from chancery practice, where, however, it was used to describe the power of the state to act in locoparentis
for the purpose of protecting the property interests and the person of
the child. But there is no trace of the doctrine in the history of criminal
jurisprudence. . ..
The right of the state, as parens patriae, to deny to the child
procedural rights available to his elders was elaborated by the assertion
that a child, unlike an adult, has a right "not to liberty but to custody." He can be made to attorn to his parents, to go to school, etc.
IuChild Neglect 475-85.
1-387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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If his parents default in effectively performing their custodial functions-that is, if the child is "delinquent"-the state may intervene. In
doing so, it does not deprive the child of any rights, because he has
none. It merely provides the "custody" to which the child is entitled.
On this basis, proceedings involving juveniles were described as "civil"
not "criminal" and therefore not subject to the requirements which
restrict the state when it seeks to deprive a person of his liberty ....
Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute
for principle and procedure.'86
The Court continued by stating that "the Juvenile Court Judge's exercise of the power of the state as parenspatriae was not unlimited."' 87
These statements cast doubt on the constitutional validity of parens
patriae to justify informal procedures that violate traditional concepts
of due process and fairness.
ProtectiveServices
The federal government has encouraged states to develop "protective services" programs as part of comprehensive child-welfare planning.
While this movement began in the 1950's, the 1962 amendments to the
Social Security Act broadened the definition of "child-welfare services"
and increased federal funding for this purpose. Some states responded
by enacting legislation that established "protective services". In many
respects such legislation has become closely related to child-abuse reporting laws. However, the reporting laws are designed to identify neglected and abused children. On the other hand, the aim of "protective
services" is to strengthen the child's home so that removal from his
parents will not be necessary. The state laws vary in their definitions of
'Id. at 16-18 (footnotes omitted).

7
1"
d. at 30. In commenting upon the doctrine of parens patriae, the Court cited to two

nineteenth-century cases, Exparte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839); In re Ferrier, 103 III. 367,
371-73 (1882), that have previously been referred to here, notes 78-79, 94, 96 & accompanying text
supra,as authority for the idea that children have almost no rights. 387 U.S. at 17 n.21. The Court

also questioned the credentials of parenspatriaein criminal jurisprudence. When the nineteenthcentury courts interpreted broadly worded statutes that authorized commitment of children to
houses of refuge and industrial schools, they were dealing with both neglected children and child
offenders who are now termed delinquents. The Court seemed to miss the fact that there was no
separate criminal jurisprudence for children. Both neglected children and child offenders were
committed to the same institutions by minor criminal courts when the use of the doctrine ofparens
patriaeexpanded American law in the nineteenth century. See Fox, supra note 106, at 1193.
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"protective services," in when and how services should be initiated, in
the authority of the child-protective agency, and in patterns of administration.188
The typical strategy of protective services is for a social agency
(public or private) to initiate contact with parents whose children are
reported to be neglected or abused. The general method is to provide
casework and other supportive services to the parents in order to help
them make the changes necessary for protection of the children. This is
a difficult assignment, for the caseworker must initiate a professional
service with clients who have not asked for help. 89 If the parents refuse
the service, the usual alternative is court action-a juvenile petition for
neglect or a criminal warrant.
There are important legal-social issues in this field. The state legislation should clarify the basis for intervention and the authority of the
child-protection agency. A particularly difficult question concerns
whether a child who is believed to be neglected or abused should remain
in his own home in physical safety while protective services are being
provided.
Children are sometimes taken from their homes too hastily. A typical response to neglect and abuse cases seems to be swift removal of the
child from his home, followed by confusion and placements of the child
in a series of foster homes, after which he is often returned to his parents.
It seems, however, that the removal is often unnecessary and that the
children return to their homes only after considerable emotional damage
and significant investments of public funds in unnecessary foster care.
A recent report of the New York State Board of Welfare stated: "'The
fact that over half of the children discharged from care return to their
own families or relatives suggests that many of them might have been
cared for at home at great savings, without intervening foster care.' "10
It also appears that judges and social workers sometimes develop
"rescue fantasies" in well-intentioned efforts to save helpless children
M

' See Paulsen 703-10.
IStrategies other than protective services are available for working with parents who abuse.
See Bean, The Parents' CenterProject:A Multiservice Approach to the Prevention of Child Abuse,
50 CHILD WELFARE 277 (1971).
'"N.Y. Times, May 16, 1971, § 1, at 57, col. 1. See also Fanshel, The Exit of Childrenfrom
Foster Care:An Interim Research Report, 50 CHILD WELFARE 65 (1971); Terr & Watson, The
BatteredChild Rebrutalized: Ten Cases of Medical-LegalConfusion, 124 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1432
(1968).
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from bad parents."' These emotions tend to obscure objective evaluations of the strengths of the child's own home. Further, they may not
recognize the strength of the child's identity with his own parents, which
makes it difficult or impossible for the child to relate to substitute parents in new settings:
The attachment of children to parents who, by all ordinary standards,
are very bad is a never-ceasing source of wonder to those who seek to
help them. Even when they are with kindly foster-parents these children
feel their roots to be in the homes where, perhaps, they have been
neglected and ill-treated, and keenly resent criticism directed against
their parents. Efforts made to "save" the child from his bad surroundings and to give him new standards are commonly of no avail, since it
is his own parents who, for good or ill, he values and with whom he is
1 2
1

identified.

CONCLUSION: ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE

The quick responses of state legislatures in enacting child-abuse
reporting laws during the 1960's reflect important legislative policy
changes in the legal framework for child protection. The reporting laws
are not an effort by the state under parenspatriaeto replace parents who
have failed. Rather, they reflect a policy to strengthen the child's own
home through state resources and services to parents so that removal will
not be necessary for effective child protection. There is an emerging
concern that children's rights be balanced with parental rights while
child protection is being provided. One of the most important judicial
needs for the 1970's is for recognition by the courts of the requirement
of due process of law in juvenile neglect hearings as a matter of constitutional dimensions.
We have moved beyond the period of public interest in child abuse
of the 1960's into a period of relative complacency. The problem is once
more almost suppressed. Child-abuse reporting laws may identify children who need protection, but they do not provide a simple solution to
the complex legal and social issues involved in child protection. The legal
framework for child protection must be supplemented by providing the
"'See Burt, supra note 183, at 1278-79.
'This passage is from the classic work of John Bowlby on the psychological significance of

separating a child from his parents. J. Bowav, CHILD CARE AND
1965), quoted in Burt, supra note 183, at 1279.
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resources for child protection. Identification of abuse cases through reporting will be meaningless without effective protective services. Some
legislatures have enacted reporting laws without providing funds or personnel to implement protective services. Further, the state of knowledge
in the field is not yet sufficient to piovide effective services or intervention in all cases. Much remains to'be learned.
Even if we had the knowledge, adequate reporting laws, and personnel for implementation, the problems of developing an effective protective services program at the community level would be formidable. Such
programs-would require skilled professionals, interdisciplinary teamwork among several professional disciplines (medicine, psychiatry, social work, law, law enforcement, and others), a sensitive and yet aggressive approach, the ability to work comfortably with authority and authoritative agencies, and the development of new strategies. The coordination of community-level resources for effective implementation is always difficult.
In the end, however, the usefulness of the entire system for child
protection-the social agencies, courts, law enforcement, hospitals, doctors, nurses, and others-will depend on the effectiveness of the services
themselves and the protection that is provided in a particular case.

